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This paper assesses the policy response to the use of cellular phones while driving 
from a legal, economic and political perspective. We argue that there is a fundamental 
disconnect between law and policy analysis. The disconnect arises largely because the 
political process is more responsive to the public’s perception of risk than the scientists’ 
risk assessments and the economists’ policy analyses. Consequently, lawmakers are 
advocating both inefficient and ineffective regulatory options while ignoring important 
aspects of the problem. If cell phones represented an isolated example, there would be 
little cause for concern. Unfortunately, the problem is more general and therefore 
demands that policy makers consider new institutions for addressing potential biases in 
decision making. We examine possible explanations for the disconnect between law and 
policy analysis, and suggest some lessons about the design of institutions for addressing 








































The Disconnect Between Law and Policy Analysis: 
A Case Study of Drivers and Cell Phones 
 




By now, it is difficult to go anywhere in the world without seeing someone using 
a cell phone.
1 In fact, the number of cellular phones will surpass the number of 
traditional, fixed line phones by the end of 2002.
2 These devices have been used to help 
usher in a peaceful transition of power in the Philippines and to call home after winning a 
gold medal in the 2002 winter Olympics.
3 The cellular phone calls placed by victims of 
the September 11
th terrorist attacks are part of history.
4 But cell phones have many more 
mundane uses as well––ranging from checking on Little Johnnie at school to picking up 
groceries.  
Cellular phone use has exploded over the past two decades. In January of 1985, 
there were fewer than 100,000 subscribers in the U.S. Today there are over 135 million.
5 
Roughly 50% of the U.S. population owns a cell phone and that number can be expected 
to grow as rates continue to decline and services, such as email and Internet access, 
increase. Figure 1 shows the rapid growth of the cellular industry in the U.S. in terms of 
subscribers and total industry revenues. Revenues climbed from less than $1 million in 
1985 to almost $60 billion in 2001.
6  
                                                 
1 The terms cell phone, mobile phone, cellular phone and cellular telephone are used interchangeably in this 
paper and include mobile telephones using digital technology on the Personal Communication Service 
(PCS) spectrum, like Sprint PCS service.  
2 U.N.: Cell phones to overtake fixed lines within months, BUS. NEWS, Feb. 8, 2002. 
3 For the role cell phones played in the downfall of Joseph Estrada, see Jennifer E. Bagalawis, Philippines: 
How technology helped kick out a President, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 29, 2001. See also, Richard Lloyd 
Parry,  The TXT MSG Revolution,  THE INDEP.  (London), Jan. 23, 2001, at Features page 1. See also  A 
Virtual Blizzard That Snarled Manila, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at A3. For cell phones at the Olympics, 
see Gary Mason, These Have Become the Cell Phone Olympics, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 15, 2002, at D5. 
4 For one well-known example, see Neil A. Lewis, A Day of Terror: Final Moments; Solicitor General Got 
2 Calls From Wife on Doomed Plane, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A19. For a description of the surge in 
cellular calls on September 11
th, see James Coates and Barbara Rose, Jammed Phone Systems Falter, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 11, 2001. Available at  http://www.chicagotribune.com/technology/chi-
010911web.story?coll=chi-technology-hed. Last visited 4/8/02. 
5 See also, Figure 1. Data from the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association Web site, at 
http://www.wow-com.com/industry/stats/surveys. (The most recent estimate of the number of subscribers is 
given at the top of the page.) Last visited Mar. 26, 2002. 
6 Dollars have not been adjusted for inflation. Revenues include the total service revenues from providers 



















































































































U.S. Subscribers Total Revenues from Cellular Service
 
Source: CTIA Web site, see note 5. 
Note: Number of U.S. subscribers in June of given year. Revenues measured from June 
of previous year to June of given year. Subscribers rounded to nearest thousand. 
Revenues rounded to nearest million. Revenues are not adjusted for inflation. 






Many consumers place a high value on the convenience of cell phones. Cell 
phones and related technologies also provide businesses with real-time capabilities for 
information transmission that were simply unavailable and, in some cases, unimaginable 
twenty years ago. Cutting-edge cell phones in South Korea have built-in digital cameras 
to take and send photos, and can be used to purchase items online. The most advanced 
phones on the Japanese market allow video calls.
7 The low-cost transmission of 
information using mobile phones has given rise to significant economic benefits.
8  
But the introduction of cellular phones, like many other new technologies, has not 
been without its costs or controversies. One of the areas of greatest concern has been the 
use of cellular phones while driving. Studies estimate that cell phone use in vehicles may 
cause anywhere from 10 to 1,000 fatalities per year in the U.S., and a great many more 
non-fatal accidents.
9  
The risk associated with calling while driving has received a great deal of 
attention. The scientific literature on the subject has been widely reported in the media 
and the federal government has investigated the issue.
10  While relatively few states and 
local jurisdictions have passed legislation, many lawmakers and city councils have 
debated restrictions on cell phone use while driving.
11 Internationally, several countries 
                                                 
7 3G by any other name, The Economist, Jan. 12, 2002. Matthew May, Welcome to the future; Japanese 3G 
service, COMM. INT’L, Feb. 1, 2002. 
8 Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITIES: MICROECONOMICS, 1-38 (1997).  
9 Donald A. Redelmeier and Milton C. Weinstein,  Cost-Effectiveness of Regulations against Using a 
Cellular Telephone while Driving, 19, MED. DECISION MAKING, 1 (Jan-Mar 1999) (which estimates 730 
annual fatalities a year caused by cell phones). Robert W. Hahn and Paul C. Tetlock, The Economics of 
Regulating Cellular Phones in Vehicles, at 1, (Working Paper 99-9, Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, 1999). Available at 
http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/working/working_99_09.pdf. Last visited Apr. 8, 2002 (which 
estimates about 100 fatalities per year). Robert W. Hahn, Paul C. Tetlock and Jason K. Burnett, Should You 
Be Allowed To Use Your Cellular Phone While Driving?, 23,  REG., 49, available at 
http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/related/cellphones.pdf. Last visited Apr. 9, 2002 (which 
calculates a range of 10 to 1,000 deaths, with a best estimate of 300 fatalities per year). 
10 For an example of coverage in the media, see the Car Talk Web site at 
http://cartalk.cars.com/About/Drive-Now/index.html. Last visited Mar. 26, 2002. For an example of 
government interest in the topic, see the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),  An 
Investigation of the Safety Implications of Wireless Communications in Vehicles (1997) at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/wireless/index.html#toc. Last visited Mar. 26, 2002. 
11 This paper will use the terms “ban,” “restriction,” and “regulation” interchangeably. Furthermore, a ban 
that allows hands-free phones but not hand-held phones will be called a hand-held ban (or restriction or 
regulation). If a ban is on all phone types, that will be specified with a phrase like “cell phone ban” or “ban 
on all phone types.” If the text simply says, “ban” (or restriction or regulation), then that should be 
interpreted as any or either type of ban. Example: Two bans were proposed; one was a hand-held ban and 






have reinterpreted existing laws or written new laws to address the practice. Many of 




  Some proponents of regulating cell phones while driving believe the risks are so 
obvious that no analysis is needed. Cell phone use while driving should simply be 
banned. The hosts of National Public Radio’s “Car Talk”, Tom and Ray Magliozzi, have 
taken such a position. The Car Talk Web site has a whole section on the issue of talking 
and driving and gives away bumper stickers that read “Drive Now…Talk Later!”
14 The 
Magliozzi brothers called an earlier attempt to study the effects of a ban “a clear case of 
cost/benefit analysis run amok” and, quoting Ted Williams, advised one of the authors of 
this paper, “If you don’t think too good, then don’t think too much.”
15 The issue may be 
open and shut for the hosts of Car Talk, but it is still the subject of intense study by 
academics. We will argue that recent legislative proposals are misguided and hope that 
this paper, although not as amusing as the Magliozzi brothers, can offer some key 
insights into legal, economic and political issues associated with cell phone regulation. 
  The purpose of this paper is to examine the policy response to the use of cellular 
phones while driving. Specifically, we will argue that there is a fundamental disconnect 
between law and policy analysis in the sense that current laws and proposed legislation 
have not generally been supported by policy analysis.
16 
17 We believe that this disconnect 
is unlikely to be corrected any time soon because of the gruesome nature of some cell 
                                                 
12 Karen S. Lissy, Joshua T. Cohen, Mary Y. Park and John D. Graham, Cellular Phone Use While 
Driving: Risks and Benefits (Harvard Center for Risk Analysis), 59-63 and Appendix D (2000). 
13 Hands-free refers to a phone that has a headset, is built into the car, or otherwise does not require the user 
to hold it during operation. Hand-held phone refers to a device that is designed to be held like a traditional 
telephone. 
14 Car Talk, supra note 10.  
15 Car Talk Web site, at http://cartalk.cars.com/About/Cell-Update/tom-ray-letter.html. Visited 4/29/02. For 
the op-ed they were responding to, see Robert W. Hahn, op-ed, Driving and Talking Do Mix, N. Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 1999, at A33. A longer version appeared as Robert W. Hahn and Paul C. Tetlock, Driving and 
Talking Do Mix (Policy Matters 99-5: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, November 
1999). Available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/policy/policy_99_05.asp. Last visited Apr. 
9, 2002. 
16 Certainly, cell phones are not the only area in which such disconnects occur. See, e.g., Bruce A. 
Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89, YALE L. J. (July 
1980).  
17 This is in marked contrast to the use of policy analysis in some areas. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK 
AND REASON, (forthcoming 2002) (which argues that cost-benefit analysis and other kinds of economic 
analysis are becoming an integral part of the federal regulatory process. Both the courts and Congress seem 
to be moving in this direction). See also, Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein,  Reinventing the 






phone-related accidents, and the view that some driving activities, like using a cell phone, 
are too risky and therefore should be banned.
18 
Section II provides an overview of existing and proposed restrictions on the use of 
cell phones by drivers. Sections III and IV examine the economic and technical issues 
and conclude that the legislation discussed in Section II makes little sense. Specifically, 
Section III shows that the costs of a ban outweigh the benefits while Section IV explains 
why a hand-held ban contradicts the current scientific understanding. Section V explores 
the driving forces behind current proposals. The final section, section VI, presents our 
conclusions. 
 
II. The Cell Phone Issue Is Receiving Increased Attention from Lawmakers 
 
In the summer of 2001, the state of New York passed a law banning the use of 
hand-held cell phones while driving. Starting November 1
st of 2001, drivers face a $100 
fine for violations. Hands-free devices are allowed under the statute.
19 While New York 
is the only U.S. state to have passed a hand-held phone ban, the issue of talking and 
driving has been prominent throughout the country. So far, 21 states have taken action 
addressing the use of cell phones by drivers.
20 There are several different types of laws 
and regulation, including New York’s ban, requirements for data collection, limitations 
on using headsets, and laws that assert the authority of states to regulate the use of cell 
phones by drivers rather than local jurisdictions. Requirements for more data collection 











                                                 
18 Other factors affecting the decision to ban cell phones will be addressed in Section V. For example, some 
people may view the habit as unnecessary and therefore a needless increase in risk. 
19 “Yada, yada, yad…”, THE ECONOMIST, June 30, 2001. 
20 This includes 2 laws that address similar issues of drivers distracted by electronic devices. See Table 1, 
















Collection  Other 
Arizona 
c       
School bus drivers may not wear a headset or use a 
cellular phone while the bus is in motion 
California
 b,c      Yes 
Car rental agencies must provide safety 
information on cell phones; Observes National 
Wireless Safety Week 
Florida 
c      Yes  Headsets must leave one ear uncovered 
Illinois 
b        Headsets must leave one ear uncovered 
Iowa 
c      Yes    
Louisiana 
b    Yes      
Maryland 
c      Yes    
Massachusetts 
a,c      Yes 
Cell phone use cannot interfere with driving and 
one hand must be on the wheel at all times; School 
bus drivers are prohibited from using cell phones 
while the bus is in motion 
Michigan 
c      Yes    
Minnesota 
b,c      Yes 
TVs may not be installed where they can be 
viewed by the driver 
Montana 
c      Yes    
Nebraska 
a      Yes   
New Jersey 
b    Yes  Yes    
New Mexico 
c    Yes     
New York 
a,b  Yes    Yes    
Oklahoma 
b,c      Yes  State laws preempt local bans 
Oregon 
a,b      Yes  Local governments can not issue bans 
Pennsylvania
b,c    Yes  Yes    
Tennessee 
b,c      Yes 
Electronic displays in utility vehicles can not be 
used while the vehicle is in motion 
Texas 
c      Yes    
Virginia 
b    Yes      
    TOTAL    1  5  16   
Note: Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico are included throughout this section. The 
majority of the data used in Tables 1 and 2 comes from the NHTSA/NCSL database, a 
cooperative attempt by NHTSA and the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL) to monitor all proposed state laws that deal with transportation issues. See Table 
1 note b. This table includes legislative actions and administrative policies. 
a Personal communication by the authors with Matt Sundeen, NCSL, May 14, 2002. 
b NHTSA/NCSL Legislative Database, available at 
 http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/ncsl/Index.cfm. 
c Matt Sundeen,  Cell Phones and Highway Safety: 2001 State Legislative Update, 
National Conference of State Legislatures Web site, at 






More laws have been proposed. In 2001, there were 146 proposed bills in 46 
states addressing this issue.
21 Restrictions on hand-held phones that allowed hands-free 
devices were proposed most often. Laws that made a distinction between phone types (57 
proposals, 32 states) were proposed almost twice as often as restrictions that treated all 
cell phones equally (33 proposals, 16 states). Restrictions that included other personal 
electronic devices (PEDs) were proposed even less than bans on all phone types (16 
proposals, 11 states). Proposals to study the issue or collect data were popular (29 
proposals, 15 states), but less popular than hand-held bans. Initiatives to inform 
consumers have been least popular, with only four proposals in three states. Proposed 
state legislation for the year 2001 is summarized in Table 2 below. 
 
                                                 
21 The number of proposed bills has increased from 67 in 2000 to 146 in 2001. The number of states 
considering legislation has increased from 15 in 1999 to 27 in 2000 to 46 in 2001. See NHTSA/NCSL, 






Table 2: Proposed State Regulations in 2001 
 


























 h  Bill Status 
i 
Alabama                    
Alaska                    
Arizona  1  1    1          Inactive 
Arkansas  1  1              Inactive 
California  3  1      2       
Enacted (2) 
Active (1) 
Colorado                    
Connecticut  4  2    1      1    Inactive 
Delaware                    
District of 
Columbia  1  1        1      Active 
Florida  2  1          1    Inactive 
Georgia  4  2        1  1    Active 
Hawaii  6  4    2  1        Active 
Idaho                    





Indiana  2    1      1      Inactive 
Iowa  2    1        1    Active 
Kansas  1  1              Active 
Kentucky  1  1              Inactive 
Louisiana  2  1        1     
Enacted (1) 
Inactive (1) 
Maine  2  1  1  1          Inactive 
Maryland  3  2        1      Inactive 
Massachusetts  5  2  3            Active 
Michigan  3  1        2  2    Active 
Minnesota  3  1  2        1    Active 
Mississippi  1    1  1      1    Inactive 
Missouri  1  1          1    Inactive 
Montana  1  1              Inactive 
Nebraska  5    1      4  1   
Active (2) 
Inactive (3) 
Nevada  1            1    Inactive 
New Hampshire 1    1  1          Inactive 




New Mexico  1          1      Inactive 










North Dakota  1          1      Inactive 
Ohio  2  2          1    Active 
Oklahoma  1              1  Enacted 
Oregon  6  1  1  2      1  2 
Enacted (1) 
Inactive (5) 
Pennsylvania  3    3           
Active (2) 
Inactive (1) 
Puerto Rico  1  1              Active 
Rhode Island  3  1  2         
  Active (2) 
Inactive (1) 
South Carolina  1    1            Active 
South Dakota  1  1    1    1      Active 




Texas  1              1  Inactive 
Utah  1  1              Inactive 
Vermont  1  1              Active 
Virginia  5  2  2  3    1     
Enacted (1) 
Inactive (4) 
Washington  3  2        1  1    Active 
West Virginia                    
Wisconsin  3    2      1      Active 
Wyoming  1  1              Inactive 
                     
TOTAL BILLS  146  57  33  16  4  29  15  15   
TOTAL STATES  46  32  16  11  3  15  14  7   
Source: NHTSA/NCSL Database, see Table 1 note b. 
NOTE: Sixteen bills fall under more than one category. Twenty-four bills target a 
specific subset of drivers, such as those with temporary permits or school bus drivers. 
a The number of bills active in 2001 that address driving and the use of cellular phones or 
other related electronic devices. 
b The number of bills that restrict hand-held but not hands-free phones. 
c The number of bills that regulate both hand-held and hands-free phones. 
d The number of bills that regulate drivers’ use of electronic devices other than, or in 
addition to, cell phones. 
e The number of bills that promote consumer education. 
f The number of bills that propose to study the issue, including proposals to collect more 
information. 
g The number of bills that regulate the use of cell phones by increasing existing penalties 
for inattentive driving or causing a crash. 
h The number of bills that are not classified under any other category. 
i Whether the bill was still under consideration (“Active”), had failed to pass (“Inactive”) 
or had been signed into law (“Enacted”) as of the end of 2001. At that time, there were a 
total of 10 bills enacted in 9 states, 84 bills active in 23 states and 52 bills inactive in 28 
states. 






Local governments have passed more restrictions than the states. At least 22 
municipalities have implemented hand-held bans that allow hands-free phones. These 
governments include five townships in Pennsylvania (one has since been overturned) and 
three counties in New York.
22 A ruling by the attorney general of Florida that local 
governments were allowed to regulate phone use paved the way for three laws in that 
state.
23 Fines range from $3 to $1000 per violation, depending on the jurisdiction, 
whether other traffic violations are observed and whether the driver is a repeat offender. 
Interestingly, Brooklyn, Ohio, the first town to enact such a ban, was also the first town 
to require the use of seat belts. As of April 18, 2001, police in Brooklyn had issued 459 
tickets.
24 An estimated 300 local jurisdictions have considered restricting the use of cell 
phones by drivers.


















                                                 
22 These county ordinances have been superseded by the statewide ban. 
23  NATIONAL  CONFERENCE OF  STATE  LEGISLATURES, A LONG FOR THE  RIDE: R EDUCING  DRIVER 
DISTRACTIONS (2002) at 56. 
24 Ron Scherer, A revolt against dialing while driving, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 18, 2001. 
25Some of the larger cities considering regulation include Aspen, CO; Boca Raton, FL; Santa Monica, CA; 







Table 3: Summary of Regulations Enacted by U.S. Municipalities 
 
Location  Hand-held ban  Other Restrictions  
Brookline, MA 
a b  Yes 
Also bans “similar handheld devices.” State 
attorney general issued an opinion against the law. 
Brooklyn, OH 
a c  Yes    
Carteret, NJ 
a  Yes    
Conshohocken, PA 
d  Yes    
Hilltown, PA 
e  Yes  Later overturned 
Lebanon, PA 
d  Yes    
Marlboro, NJ 
f  Yes    
Miami Dade County, FL
 a  Yes   
Nassau County, NY 
a  Yes    
New York, NY 
d  -  Taxi drivers banned from using any phone type  
North Olmstead, OH 
a  Yes   
Nutley, NJ 
a  Yes   
Pembroke Pines, FL 
a  Yes   
Rockland County, NY 
b  Yes    
Sandy, UT 
a  Yes   
Santa Fe, NM 
a  Yes   
Suffolk County, NY 
c  Yes    
Walton Hills, OH 
a  Yes   
West Conshohocken, PA 
a  Yes    
Westchester County, NY 
a  Yes    
Westin, FL 
a  Yes   
York, PA 
a  Yes   
 
a NCSL report, supra note 23. 
b  Dawn MacKeen,  First you dial, then you crash, SALON.COM, December 7, 2000, 
available at www.salon.com/news/health/2000/12/07/cell_phones/print.html. Last visited 
Apr. 9, 2002. 
c Scherer, supra note 24. 
d Lissy et al., supra note 12, at 59-63. 
e Cell-phone ban overturned, USA T ODAY, July 17, 2000, Tech Reviews, available at 
www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/review/crh298.htm. Last visited Apr. 9, 2002. 
f  Drivers’ cell-phone use banned in N.J. town,  USA T ODAY, July 14, 2000, Tech 
Reviews, available at www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/review/crh304.htm. Last visited 











Despite national media coverage, concerns about driving and talking have not 
been a high priority at the federal level. New Jersey Senator Jon Corzine has introduced 
S.927, which would force states to regulate the use of cell phones by drivers or face a ten 
percent cut in federal highway funds. States would have until the end of 2004 and could 
allow hands-free devices if a state determined they were safe. The bill has made little 
progress since it was introduced in May of 2001.
26 Representative Gary Ackerman 
introduced a very similar bill in the House, but it has also stalled.
27 Internally, the 
executive branch has decided to discourage the use of hand-held phones while driving. In 
March, 2002, the General Services Administration recommended that agencies 
discourage employees from using a hand-held phone while driving government owned or 
leased cars. Further, employees should be provided access to hands-free devices and 
safety information. The dangers associated with hands-free devices are not addressed.
28 
Internationally, regulation has progressed faster than in the United States. In 1988, 
the Australian state of Victoria became the first major jurisdiction to ban the use of cell 
phones by drivers.
29 At least twenty-nine countries now restrict the practice.
30 Several 
have passed new legislation, while others have relied on older legislation or driving codes 
(as in the United Kingdom). Many countries that regulate cell phones while driving are in 
Europe. These include Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Sweden; but some 
developing nations, like Brazil and South Africa, have also regulated the use of cell 
phones while driving. At least seventeen of those countries ban hand-held but allow 
hands-free phones.
31 At least four of those countries regulate the practice by increasing 
penalties for being involved in a crash while using a cellular telephone.
32 
There have also been attempts in the U.S. to apply existing laws to drivers who 
cause accidents while using their cell phones. There were 34 tort cases between 1990 and 
1999 involving cell-phone related accidents. The plaintiffs won fourteen verdicts, the 
                                                 
26 S. 927, 107
th Congress, 1
st Session, available at http://thomas.loc.gov. Last visited Apr. 9, 2002. 
27 H.R. 1837, 107
th Congress, 1
st Session, available at http://thomas.loc.gov. Last visited Apr. 9, 2002. 
28 Motor Vehicle Management, 67 FED. REG., 9453-4, (Mar. 1, 2002). 
29 Lissy et al., supra note 11, 59-63. 
30 Nations that regulate the use of cell phones while driving include Australia, Brazil, Chile, C zech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. The cities of Delhi, India 
and Hong Kong, China also restrict the use of cell phones by drivers. See Lissy et al., supra note 12; 
Sundeen, supra Table 1 note c; THE ECONOMIST, supra note 19; and NCSL, supra note 23, at 58. 






defendants won eleven and the remainder were settled out of court or arbitrated.
33 In 
1999, Smith Barney, the brokerage firm, paid $500,000 to settle a wrongful death case 
involving an employee who caused an accident while placing a business call from his 
car.
34 In Virginia, Young Ki Yoon is suing an attorney and her firm because the lawyer 
struck and killed his teenage daughter while conducting business on her cellular phone.
35 
Fears of legal liability, workers’ compensation liability and insurance premium 
increases seem to be changing corporate behavior. DuPont and Southwest Gas 
Corporation both have policies restricting employee use of cell phones while driving.
36 
United Parcel Service and many other companies are considering similar policies. The 
Society for Human Resource Management, which represents employers, recommends 
that workers be discouraged from using cell phones while driving. The society especially 
discourages mentally intensive conversation and suggests hands-free phones if calling is 
absolutely necessary.
37  
These new policies are an encouraging sign that businesses are starting to 
consider the costs to society (made manifest to them by increases in the cost of insurance, 
workers’ compensation and tort liability) and that the market is adjusting. Assuming that 
the costs of insurance and liability accurately reflect the costs to society, the market may 
solve a significant part of the problem. Employees, however, will still be under pressure 
to be productive, so it is not clear whether these new policies will be enforced or merely 
provide employers with legal cover. 
In December 2000, Jason Jones was tried for vehicular manslaughter in Upper 
Marlboro, Maryland for causing a fatal accident while talking on his phone. These are the 
first known manslaughter charges brought against a driver using a cell phone. Jones was 
found guilty only on the lesser charge of negligent driving and paid a $500 fine. If 
convicted of vehicular manslaughter, he could have faced up to 20 years in prison.
38 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Id. 
33 Lissy et al., supra note 12, at 59. 
34 Id. 
35 Pamela Mendels, Driven to Distraction; The Growing Threat of Lawsuits is Forcing Companies to Lay 










 The number of proposals and laws that would restrict the use of cell phones is 
rapidly increasing.
39 Legislation has been considered at all levels of government in the 
U.S. and the issue will likely become more important as cell phone use continues to 
increase. Although there is considerable variation among the proposals, bills to limit 
hand-held phones are the most popular.
40 There are a small number of proposals to 
include other electronic devices, and an even smaller number of bills that would attempt 
to improve safety by informing drivers.
41  
 
III. The Risk of Using a Cell Phone While Driving Is Significant, But Does Not  
     Justify a Ban 
   
There have been several studies that suggest the risk of using a cell phone while 
driving is significant. This section summarizes that literature and then reviews estimates 
of the costs and benefits of a ban.
42 There are three kinds of studies on this issue: 
epidemiological studies, which attempt to find a statistical association between cell phone 
use and accidents at the individual level;
43 experimental studies, which test driver 
performance under scientifically controlled conditions; and data on the possible cause of 
automobile crashes.
44 Taken together, the evidence clearly shows that using a cell phone 
while driving increases the risk of an accident. The mere existence of a risk, however, 
does not justify regulation, and economic analyses reviewed below suggest that a ban on 
cell phone use while driving would not be appropriate at this time.  
There is widespread agreement that using a cell phone while driving increases the 
risk of an accident. Although the issue was studied as early as the 1960’s, the most 
relevant research was done in the late 1990’s. Perhaps the best study—and one frequently 
cited by advocates of regulation—is an epidemiological study by Redelmeier and 
                                                 
39 See supra note 21. 
40 See supra Table 2. 
41 About 16% of the proposals include other portable electronic devices while only 3% include consumer 
education. See Table 2.  
42 For a more complete literature review, see Lissy et al., supra note 12 and NHTSA, supra note 10. 
43 Epidemiological studies use individual level data to correlate risk factors and health outcomes and are 
frequently done in medicine. In this case, the risk factor is using a cell phone while driving and the outcome 
is an automobile crash. See Lissy et al., supra note 12. 
44 We use the same categorization of studies as Lissy et al., supra note 12, page 14. Lissy et al. also define a 
fourth category, “ecological” studies, which look for an association between aggregated crash and cell 
phone data. Since no ecological study produced conclusive results, we have excluded the category from our 






Tibshirani, which appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1997.
45 The 
authors concluded that using a cell phone while driving increased the probability of being 
in an accident by a factor of about four.
46 This risk is significant, but comparable to other 
common risks undertaken by drivers.
47 Drivers are not the only ones injured or killed in 
automobile crashes; cell phone users put other drivers, passengers and pedestrians at risk. 
This risk is also significant, but smaller than the risk imposed by drunk drivers on other 
drivers, by drivers on pedestrians, and by drivers of large trucks on other drivers.
48  
Redelmeier  and Tibshirani used accident reports and cell phone records to 
compare cell phone use for drivers immediately before an accident with the same time on 
a previous day. In other words, for all the drivers who had an accident on Thursday, the 
authors compared the percent of drivers who were using cell phones at the time of the 
accident with the percent that were using a cell phone at the same time on Wednesday. If 
a higher percentage of the subjects were using their phones on Thursday, when the 
accidents occurred, than on Wednesday, when the drivers did not have an accident, then 
the use of cell phones is correlated with the risk of an accident. This “case-crossover” 
method means that each driver acts as his own control, which makes for an excellent 
statistical design.
49 Because Redelmeier and Tibshirani had a good statistical design and a 
                                                 
45 Donald A. Redelmeier and Robert J. Tibshirani,  Association between Cellular-Telephone Calls and 
Motor Vehicle Collisions, 336, NEW ENG. J. MED., 453-8, (Feb. 13, 1997). 
46 Id, at 453. For a discussion of why this may be an underestimate, see Donald A. Redelmeier and Robert 
J. Tibshirani, Car Phones and Car Crashes: Some Popular Misconceptions, 164,  CAN. MED. ASS’N. J ., 
1581-2 (May 29, 2001). 
47 Some journalists have attempted to put the risk associated with driving and using a cell phone in context 
by comparing it to the risk from drunk driving. For example, one story in a major newspaper says: “A 1997 
study in the New England Journal of Medicine found that talking on a phone while driving quadrupled the 
risk of an accident and was almost a dangerous as being drunk behind the wheel.” See Town Bans Driver 
Cell-Phone Use, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 1999, Tech Reviews. While the relative risk of using a cell phone 
while driving is similar to driving with a blood alcohol content at or below the legal limit, driving with a 
blood alcohol content above the legal limit is much more dangerous. And since the average phone call is 
relatively short compared to the average period of intoxication, drunk driving is a greater total risk. Or, as 
Redelmeier and Tibshirani say, “Some people have interpreted our research as indicating that using a 
cellular telephone is equivalent to driving drunk. This is not true…The cumulative risks associated with 
alcohol intoxication are much greater than those associated with using a cellular telephone.”  See Donald 
A. Redelmeier and Robert J. Tibshirani, Is Using a Car Phone Like Driving Drunk?, 10,  CHANCE, 5-10 
(1997). 
48 See Lissy et al., supra note 12, at 37-38. 
49 If the drivers in the two samples (those having accidents and those not having accidents) were different, 
then one would have to control for a host of factors, such as driver age, sex, experience, and socioeconomic 






large sample size, their results are persuasive.
50 The authors further tested the robustness 
of their conclusions with a thorough sensitivity analysis.  
The study does have some weaknesses, however. First, the authors only studied 
accidents with substantial property damage, but with no personal injury.
51 While it may 
be reasonable to assume that a study of accidents with fatalities and injuries could 
produce similar results, this is an assumption that ideally should be tested.
52 Second, the 
authors needed the cooperation of the subjects, and a significant number of those initially 
screened declined to participate.
53 Third, the risk associated with drivers using cell 
phones in the study may not be applicable to the general population. Suppose that relative 
risk were influenced by cell phone use and another factor, such as driving experience, so 
that the relative risk of inexperienced drivers using phones was much higher than the 
relative risk of experienced drivers using cell phones. A pool of drivers who have been in 
a crash will tend to have more inexperienced drivers than their numbers in the population. 
Hence, the final result, using the Redelmeier and Tibshirani methodology, would 
overestimate the relative risk if it were applied to the general population. While there is 
no evidence to support the hypothesis that the Redelmeier and Tibshirani subjects were 
disproportionately inexperienced, it is possibly significant that their subjects had phone 
bills about 40% higher than the average subscriber. This is not a weakness of the study so 
much as a caveat for interpreting the study for policy implications.
54 Fourth, while 
Redelmeier and Tibshirani conclusively showed a correlation, they d id not prove 
causation. In other words, an increase in accidents and an increase in cell phone use could 
both be caused by a third factor, such as bad weather or heavy traffic.  
The findings of Redelmeier and Tibshirani have been supported by several 
experimental studies that have attempted to test causation. Although no one experimental 
study has been as comprehensive as the Redelmeier and Tibshirani study, the 
                                                 
50 The authors identified 5890 drivers who met initial criteria for accident type during the selected time 
period in the Toronto area. 1064 acknowledged having a cellular telephone, 742 consented to participate in 
the study and phone records were located for 699 drivers, which is the sample size. 170 subjects had used 
their cell phones before the crash, 37 drivers had used their phone on the control day and 13 subjects had 
used their phone on both days. See Redelmeier and Tibshirani, supra note 45. 
51 Also excluded were accidents involving criminal activity or the transport of dangerous goods. See 
Redelmeier and Tibshirani, supra note 45. 
52 Hahn et al. suggest that drivers may exercise more caution in situations where fatal or injurious accidents 
are more likely to happen. Hahn et al., supra note 8, at 49.  
53 See, supra note 50. 






experimental studies have shown a consistent pattern. Both conversation and the use of 
phone-like devices represent a distraction for drivers, even under controlled conditions. 
Using a simulator, McKnight and McKnight tested subjects under a variety of driving 
conditions and distraction levels. The authors found conversation to be a significant 
distraction.
55 A study by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia tested subjects in 
real cars on a closed driving course. This study also found negative effects on driving 
performance.
56 These studies, and others discussed in Section IV, reinforce the findings 
in Redelmeier and Tibshirani, supporting the view that cell phone use while driving does 
indeed increase the risk of driving.  
Actual evaluation of crash data can be used to further our understanding of the 
relationship between cell phone use and driving. One study that examined crash data was 
conducted by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety and the University of North 
Carolina Highway Safety Research Center.
57 The AAA study compared the role of 
various distractions in causing crashes recorded in the National Automotive Sampling 
System (NASS) database over a five year period.
58 The NASS data are based on a 
random sample of police records of significant crashes that are then supplemented by 
medical records, interviews and other information collected by researchers.
59 The AAA 
study found that cellular phones were a significant, but relatively small factor in the crash 
data. Of the distraction-related crashes, 1.5% were associated with using a cell phone.
60 
This is significantly less than from distractions outside the vehicle (29.4%), adjusting the 
radio controls (11.4%) and other occupants (10.9%).
61 Cell phone related crashes are 
comparable in magnitude to crashes caused by smoking (0.9%) or eating (1.7%).
62 
                                                 
55 James McKnight and A. Scott McKnight,  The Effect of Cellular Phone Use Upon Driver Attention, 
National Public Services Research Institute (1991), at 
http://www.aaafoundation.org/resources/index.cfm?button=cellphone. Last visited Apr. 9, 2002. For more 
on these studies, see Section IV, below. For more citations of general literature reviews, see supra note 42. 
56  The Impact of Auditory Tasks (as in hand-free phone use) on Driving Performance, Insurance 
Corporation of British Columbia Transportation Safety Research, (November 2000), at 
http://www.icbc.com/Library/research_papers/Cell_phones/Cellphones_Impact2.pdf. Last visited Apr. 9, 
2002. 
57 Jane C. Stutts, Donald W. Reinfurt, Loren Staplin, and Eric A. Rodgman, The Role of Driver Distraction 
in Traffic Crashes, AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, (May 2001), at 
http://www.aaafoundation.org/projects/index.cfm?button=distraction. Last visited Apr. 9, 2002. 
58 The NASS database is funded by NHTSA and is also known as the Crashworthiness Data System (CDS). 
See id., § “Executive Summary” and NHTSA, supra note 10, Chapter 3. 
59 See Stutts et al., supra note 57. 
60 Id., § “Executive Summary.” 
61 Id. 






Unfortunately, crash data typically have several problems. It is not always 
possible to determine the actual cause of a crash. Much of the information comes from 
the police report, but data collection is not the primary task of officers at the scene of an 
accident. Drivers may not be honest about the cause of an accident, especially if they fear 
liability. Moreover, the drivers may have been killed in the crash.  
Information on cell phone use is particularly problematic. Information collection 
concerning cell phone use is not widespread or very systematic. Only two states have 
specifically asked for information about cell phones for a significant time period.
63 
Distractions in general, and cell phone use in particular, are probably underrepresented in 
the database.
64 Notwithstanding these deficiencies, studies of crash data provide a useful 
check on other sources of information.
65 
Together, these three types of studies show that the use of cell phones increases 
the risk of having an accident while driving. Some people believe that the mere existence 
of risk, or the existence of a risk and some personal judgment about the behavior, justifies 
regulation.
66 This approach to regulation is overly simplistic, since virtually all activities 
involve risk.
67 Regulations should be analyzed so that their costs and benefits can be 
effectively evaluated and compared.
68  
A good policy should pass a broadly defined benefit-cost test.
69 In this case, that 
means analyzing the benefits of a ban, which include the reductions in fatalities and 
                                                 
63 See NHTSA, supra note 10. 
64 For example, a reporting officer may not see the cell phone and therefore might not ask the driver. Or, a 
driver may be reluctant to admit using a cell phone at the time of the crash because of a fear of liability. For 
a discussion, see Stutts et al., supra note 57, § “Summary and Conclusions.” See also, NHTSA, supra note 
10, Chapter 3. 
65 For more on the strengths and weaknesses of crash data, see NHTSA supra note 10, Chapter 3 and Stutts 
et al., supra note 57. 
66 See, e.g., see Car Talk Web site, supra note 10. 
67 For a discussion of problems that can arise from regulating without analysis, see  STEPHEN BREYER, 
BREAKING THE VICIOUS  CIRCLE: T OWARD EFFECTIVE RISK  REGULATION (1993). See also, Tammy O. 
Tengs and John D. Graham,  The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving, in 
RISKS, C OSTS AND LIVES  SAVED: G ETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION, (Robert W. Hahn, ed., 
1996).  
68 Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Regulation?,” Science, (April 12, 1996). Another version appeared as Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost 
Analysis in Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles. (AEI Press, 1996). 
Available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/books/benefit_cost_analysis.pdf. Last visited Apr. 
21, 2002. 
69 When the economic benefits of a policy exceed the economic costs, that policy is said to increase 
efficiency or economic efficiency. For a general discussion see, Arrow et al., supra note 68, and Crandall et 
al.,  An Agenda for Federal Regulatory Reform, (1997). Available at 






property damage, and the costs of a ban, which means measuring how much drivers value 
the unregulated use of their phones while driving. 
  There have been three studies examining the economics of banning the use of cell 
phones by drivers.
70 Although differing in the details, each finds that a cell phone ban 
would be a costly way to save lives.
71  
Redelmeier and Weinstein assess the net benefits and cost effectiveness of a cell 
phone ban, and find that a cell phone ban would not be a very cost-effective way to save 
lives.
72 Using the results of Redelmeier and Tibshirani, the authors estimated that cell 
phones were responsible for approximately 600,000 collisions, 730 deaths, 115,000 
injuries and $1.8 billion in health care costs and property damages annually.
73 The 
elimination of those accidents constitutes the benefits of a ban. Redelmeier and Weinstein 
estimate the annual costs of a ban at $12 billion of foregone welfare.
74 The authors 
estimate that a cell phone ban would cost $300,000 per quality-adjusted life year 
                                                                                                                                                 
In practice, economists try to measure benefits by estimating the amount each individual is willing to pay 
for making cell phone calls while driving, and summing these amounts across individuals. In this case, no 
distinction is made between the marginal utility of a dollar from a poor person or a rich person. In principal, 
one could make such distinctions, but they are not typically done in practice. Costs are typically measured 
by the costs of making additional cellular phone calls. For a general treatment, see, Robert W. Hahn and 
John A. Hird,  The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8,  YALE J. R EG., 233-78 
(Winter 1991). Economists and other social scientists accept that policy makers frequently pursue policy 
goals in addition to maximizing net benefits, or in some cases instead of maximizing net benefits. One such 
goal could be a fairer income distribution. For a discussion of these factors, see the same sources and Cass 
R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, MICH. L. REV. (2001). For a discussion of alternatives when 
certain kinds of information are difficult to obtain, see  LESTER  B. L AVE, THE  STRATEGY OF  SOCIAL 
REGULATION (1981) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis typically requires a great deal of information, where 
as other forms of analysis, such as cost-effectiveness analysis, require less). For another useful discussion 
of  cost-benefit analysis, see  COST-BENEFIT  ANALYSIS: L EGAL, E CONOMIC,  AND  PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, ed., 2001). 
70 See Hahn et al., supra note 9; Redelmeier and Weinstein, supra note 9; and Lissy et al., supra note 12. 
Hahn and Tetlock, supra note 9, is an earlier version of Hahn et al. 
71 Social scientists frequently measure the effectiveness of a government policy in terms of the cost of 
saving an additional life or life-year, or the cost of reducing specific injuries. This information allows 
public officials to make decisions about targeting expenditures to those activities that are likely to save the 
most lives for a given amount of expenditures. See, e.g., Tengs and Graham,  The Opportunity Costs of 
Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving and Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government’s 
Numbers Tell Us?, in RISKS, C OSTS AND LIVES  SAVED: G ETTING  BETTER  RESULTS FROM  REGULATION, 
(Robert W. Hahn, ed., 1996). Also see W. Kip Viscusi, Economic Foundations of the Current Regulatory 
Reform Efforts, 10, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 119-34 (Summer 1996). Also see, John F. Morrall, A Review of 
the Record, 10, REG., 25-34 (1986). For a critique of this literature, see Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs 
of Mythic Proportions, 107, YALE L. J., 1981-2070 (May 1998). For a response to some of the issues raised 
by Heinzerling, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (forthcoming, 2002).  
72 See Redelmeier and Weinstein, supra note 9. The study models the United States in 1997, and uses 1997 
U.S. dollars. However, the epidemiological study and the demand curve are both based on Canadian data, 
which is one flaw of the study. 
73 See Redelmeier and Weinstein, supra note 9, at 1. 







75 saved, with a range of $50,000 to  $700,000.
76 Compared to seat belts or 
driver-side airbags, a cell-phone ban would not be a very good investment in saving 
lives.
77  
The authors also examined the idea of a selective ban by estimating the cost-
effectiveness for a ban on males under the age of 18. Five states have proposed a ban that 
would only affect minors or drivers with a learners’ permit.
78 Assuming that drivers 
under 18, compared to the general population, have a higher base rate of collision, a 
slightly higher relative risk while using a cell phone, and more expected years of life 
remaining, Redelmeier and Weinstein concluded that a selective ban would be relatively 
cost-effective, about $10,000 per QALY saved.
79 Minors generally are involved in more 
crashes than older drivers.
80 It is not clear whether their relative risk while using a cell 
phone should be higher or lower than the population average. Experimental studies that 
have attempted to measure the effect of age have generally found that young people can 
manage driving and using a phone better than elderly drivers.
81 On the other hand, crash 
data have generally found that young people are disproportionately represented among 
distraction related crashes.
82 Enforcement of a selective ban may be very difficult since 
                                                 
75 A quality-adjusted life year (QALY) is a unit of health measurement that includes both quantity and 
quality of life. QALY analysis assumes that more years of life are better than fewer, that healthier years are 
better than sicker years and that the two can be compared. A regulation that reduces premature deaths saves 
QALY’s. A rule that reduces premature deaths among the young saves more QALY’s and a regulation that 
reduces premature death and injury to the young saves even more. For more on different measures health, 
see VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH, (George Tolley, Donald Kenkal and Robert 
Fabian, ed., 1994), especially Chapter 6, by Robert Fabian.  
76 See Redelmeier and Weinstein, supra note 9, at 1. 
77 The cost-savings associated with seat belts exceed the costs. Driver-side airbags cost $24,000 per QALY. 
See Id., and Lissy et al., supra note 12, at 57. A lower cost per QALY is considered more desirable because 
it means that society uses fewer resources and/or sacrifices less welfare to save a unit of life. (Generally, 
see citations, supra note 71.) 
78 See NHTSA/NCSL, supra Table 2, note b. 
79 See Redelmeier and Weinstein, supra note 9, at 6. Ideally, the cost-effectiveness of a ban on young 
drivers should be calculated using a demand curve specific to those drivers. Unfortunately, it is not 
available. Furthermore, the demand curve estimated by Redelmeier and Weinstein has serious problems 
and applies to Canada. See discussion, Hahn and Tetlock, supra note 9, at 9-12 and Appendix. 
80  Traffic Safety Facts 2000: Overview, NHTSA, 11 (2000). Available at  http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2000/2000ovrfacts.pdf. Last visited Apr. 21, 2002. While middle-
aged drivers are the safest, senior citizens suffer as many fatalities per vehicle mile driven as under-age 
drivers. Therefore, if we consider a selective ban on young drivers, we should also consider the same for 
elderly drivers. Note however, that under the QALY valuation approach, the benefits of saving elderly 
drivers would be smaller. 
81 Most notably, see McKnight and McKnight, supra note 55, § “Effects of Age.” 






police would need to guess the age of passing motorists. Nevertheless, a selective ban 
may be worth further investigation.  
  The results of Hahn et al. were even more skeptical of a ban.
83 The authors used a 
combination of results from Redelmeier and Tibshirani and crash data from the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to estimate the risk from cell phones.
84 
Hahn et al. estimated that cell phones were annually responsible for 300 deaths, 38,000 
accidents involving injuries and total economic losses (including deaths and injuries) of 
$4.6 billion.
85 The authors estimated the costs of a ban to be $25 billion, and the net costs 
to society to be $20 billion annually.
86 The authors also examined the sensitivity of the 
key variables and found that positive net benefits were possible, but only using very 
conservative estimates for several variables.
87 
  Hahn et al. also estimated the costs and benefits of a hand-held ban that allows 
hands-free devices. A hands-free policy would reduce both costs and benefits, compared 
to a c omplete ban, but would still result in negative net benefits under most 
circumstances. The authors estimate that unless the policy reduced accidents by 25% or 
more, it would fail a benefit-cost test.
88 Redelmeier and Weinstein also examined the 
issue and concluded, “A selective policy that restricted hand-held but not hands-free 
cellular telephones yielded smaller benefits and costs but a similar cost-effectiveness 
ratio, unless hands-free telephones had enormous safety advantages.”
89 As discussed 
below, there is no evidence that the safety advantage of hands-free phones would be 
large, let alone enormous. 
  Both studies come to the same conclusion, but do have some differences. 
Redelmeier and Weinstein rely on the epidemiological results from Redelmeier and 
Tibshirani to calculate risk. Hahn et al. use that study as an upper bound, state crash data 
as a lower bound and a weighted average as a best estimate.
90 The result is that 
                                                 
83 Hahn et al., supra note 9. Hahn et al. Is an update of Hahn and Tetlock, supra note 9. For a critique of 
this study, see Lissy et al., supra note 12. 
84 See NHTSA, supra note 10.  
85 Hahn et al., supra note 9, at 49. Hahn et al. use 1999 U.S. dollars. Id., at 46. 
86 Id., at 48 and 50. 
87 Id., at 50-52. 
88 Id., at 50-52. 
89 Redelmeier and Weinstein, supra note 9, at 7. 
90 For a discussion of differences, see Hahn and Tetlock, supra note 9, at 9. For details on the calculations, 
see Hahn et al., supra note  9, at 49; Hahn and Tetlock, supra note  9, Appendix; and Redelmeier and 






Redelmeier and Weinstein estimate that cell phones are responsible for about twice as 
many fatalities per year as Hahn  et al. The two studies also use different demand 
functions. Redelmeier and Weinstein use a simple demand function based on eight 
observations while Hahn et al. use a more sophisticated demand function derived from a 
well-known study of the cellular phone market by Jerry Hausman.
91 Redelmeier and 
Weinstein use Canadian data to derive the demand, while Hahn et al. rely on U.S. data. 
The result is that Hahn et al. estimate a larger total loss in consumer welfare from a ban 
than do Redelmeier and Weinstein.
92 
  A third study, by Lissy et al., builds on the other two.
93 The authors used the costs 
of a ban from Hahn  et al. and the benefits of a ban calculated by Redelmeier and 
Weinstein. The net costs, $23 billion per year, were similar to those calculated by Hahn et 
al.
94 The cost-effectiveness, $700,000 per QALY, is similar to the upper bound of the 
Redelmeier and Weinstein study and about twice the best estimate.
95 Lissy et al. compare 
the cost-effectiveness of a ban on cell phones with eight other traffic safety measures and 
find that it would not be a very cost-effective method of saving lives. Of the eight other 
policies, two would reduce costs (seatbelts and daytime running lights) and four are an 
order of magnitude less expensive than a cell-phone ban (front-crash airbags, side door 
beams, frontal-crash passenger airbags and 55 mile-per-hour speed limit). Only one is 
more expensive. The 55 mile-per-hour speed limit, at $82,000 per QALY, is an especially 
appropriate comparison since the costs are largely “inconvenience” costs, like a cell 
phone ban, yet many states have recently raised their speed limits to 65 mile-per-hour.
96 
Four factors could also significantly change the results of any of these studies.
97 
First, both studies use demand curves for making cellular calls generally rather than while 
driving, because of the absence of data on the demand for using a cell phone while 
driving. They then provide a rough estimate of the demand for using cellular phone while 
driving. A more appropriate demand curve for this analysis would measure how much 
                                                 
91 See Hausman, supra note 8. 
92 For a discussion of the differences between the demand curves used by the two studies, see Hahn and 
Tetlock, supra note 8, at 9, and citations, supra note 90.  
93 Lissy et al., supra note 12 at 54-58. 
94 Id. at 54. 
95 Id. at 55 and Redelmeier and Weinstein, supra note 9, at 1. 






consumers would pay to use their cell phone while driving instead of using another 
technology, such as a land line, not placing a call, or using the cell phone at another 
time.
98  
The second issue is related to the first; we do not know exactly what substitutions 
drivers will make and how this could affect safety.
99 Calling and asking for directions 
while driving is risky, but reading a map while driving is more distracting.
100 Pulling over 
to the side of the road and then merging again with traffic presents its own risk.  
The third issue is enforcement. How will the law be enforced and will this 
increase or decrease efficiency? If the ban were poorly enforced and only drivers who 
placed a high value on calling were willing to risk getting caught, the costs of a ban 
would be less. However, the opposite could also be true. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the New York City ban on calling and driving by taxi drivers is widely ignored.
101 
This would imply that the costs are much lower than expected and the benefits practically 
nil, but no study has been done. 
Lastly, the studies could be dated. While all three studies were completed in the 
last few years, the demand curves, crash data and epidemiological evidence are older. 
During those years, millions of new cellular subscribers have been added and the price 
for cellular service has dropped, meaning that both the costs and benefits of a ban have 
changed. Presumably, the population risks are greater because there are more drivers with 
phones and the total costs of a ban are greater because there are more users. The net 
effect is not immediately clear.
 102 
  Even with the preceding issues unresolved, the current literature strongly suggests 
that a total ban on u sing cell phones while driving would be a rather expensive way to 
save lives. While positive net benefits are within the ranges calculated by the three 
                                                                                                                                                 
97 All three studies discuss the uncertainties involved. The following is based on Hahn et al., supra note 9, 
at 52-53. Also see, Hahn and Tetlock, supra note 9, at 18-21; and Redelmeier and Weinstein, supra note 9, 
at 7-8. 
98 For example, it is not known how much consumers value avoiding the inconvenience of pulling over to 
the side of the road.  
99 The seminal work on this subject is Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83, J. 
POL. ECON., 677-725 (1975). 
100 See Hahn and Tetlock, supra note 9, at 19-20. 
101 “Although the Taxi and Limousine Commission prohibits licensed drivers from using cell phones, 
cabbies and passengers alike say many openly flout the rule by having wireless conversations while 
driving.” Pete Donohue, Hail Yes, Cabbies Love to Chat, DAILY NEWS (New York), May 20, 2001, at 24. 
102 See Joshua T. Cohen, A Revised Economic Analysis of Restrictions on the Use of Cell Phones While 






studies, they result only when fairly optimistic assumptions are used. In all cases, the best 
estimates of net benefits are negative. A hands-free policy would only be worthwhile if 
the safety advantages were large. A targeted ban, such as for young drivers, might 
deserve more investigation.  
 
IV. The Case for Hands-Free Cell Phones Saving Lives is Weak to Nonexistent 
 
The differences between a hands-free cell phone and a hand-held cell phone 
deserve special attention for two reasons. First, if there is a big safety advantage, a hand-
held ban that allows hands-free devices could be much more cost-effective than a total 
ban, and could even be a desirable social investment. Second, lawmakers are already 
assuming that there is a significant safety advantage. As noted above, hand-held bans are 
prominently featured in most proposed and current laws.  
Because of the great interest in requiring hands-free devices while driving, the 
science behind this policy should be examined carefully. This section critically reviews 
the scientific literature comparing hand-held and hands-free cell phones. While there 
have been several reviews of the risk of cell phones, and the benefits and costs of a ban, 
none has provided an in-depth review of the hands-free issue. This paper fills this void in 
the literature.
103  
Our review of the literature on hands-free devices is divided into three parts. The 
first part reviews experimental and epidemiological studies that are relevant to the hands-
free issue.
104 The second part analyzes the available crash data and the third part 
examines what general literature reviews have said about hands-free phones and driving. 
The appendix summarizes the studies reviewed in this section. 
 
 
                                                 
103 For general reviews of the literature relating to cell phone use and driving see NHTSA, supra note 10; 
Lissy et al., supra note 12. See also, Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones, Chaired by Sir William 
Stewart,  Mobile Phones and Health, National Radiological Protection Board, (Oxford, 2000) at 
http://www.iegmp.org.uk/. Last visited Apr. 16, 2002. See also, Alasdair Cane and Mark Burris, 
Investigation of the Use of Mobile Phones While Driving, Center for Urban Transportation Research, 
University of South Florida, (April 1999), at http://www.cutr.eng.usf.edu/index2.htm . Last visited Apr. 16, 
2002. 
104 As discussed below, many of these studies are focused on the general risk posed by using cell phones 
while driving, not on comparing hands-free and hand-held devices. We have selected those studies most 
relevant to the hands-free issue, whether they were designed to study that specific issue or not. For a 






A. Experimental and Epidemiological Evidence Show that Hands-Free Phones Offer 
Few Safety Advantages 
 
  The scientific studies testing the risks of driving while using a cell phone use a 
variety of methodologies. This section compares hands-free and hand-held phones by 
examining different kinds of distraction that can result from using a cell phone and 
analyzing studies that relate to those distractions. First, we examine the risk posed by 
dialing a cell phone; second, we consider other possible physical distractions; and third, 
we analyze the role of conversation as a mental distraction. The literature suggests that 
the risk posed by dialing is not large compared to conversation; the risks posed by other 
possible distractions do not appear to be significant; and the risks associated with 
conversation appear to be significant, and furthermore, are unaffected by phone type. 
These studies are summarized in Table A-1 of the Appendix. 
  Two studies suggest that manually dialing a cell phone can be a distraction while 
driving. A study by Brookhius et al. compared the use of hands-free and hand-held 
phones while people drove under various traffic conditions.
105 The authors measured the 
position of the automobile, reactions to speed changes of the lead vehicle, steering wheel 
movement, rearview mirror usage and heart rate. The authors concluded that hand-held 
devices pose a greater risk, noting, “In order to minimize the risk involved, it is strongly 
recommended to allow only hands-free mobile telephone sets, preferably equipped with a 
voice activated dialing system.”
106 This conclusion was based on the observation that 
dialing was distracting, as compared to a control condition. “If the subjects had to dial a 
number manually, a substantial effect on the steering wheel amplitude was apparent. 
Operating the telephone equipment required too much attention at that specific moment, 
leading to amplitudes which were ten times the amplitude on the quiet motorway.”
107 
Dialing was the only observed difference between the phone types. This study is 
noteworthy for comparing hand-held and hands-free devices directly and for using actual 
cars, not simulators.
108 The sample of twelve drivers is very small, however, and the 
                                                 
105 Karel A. Brookhius, Gerbrand de Vries and Dick de Waard,  The Effects of Mobile Telephoning on 
Driving Performance, 23, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION, 309-316 (1991).  
106 Id. at 315. 
107 Id. at 314. 
108 Although simulators offer certain advantages for the experimenters, we believe real cars provide more 
meaningful results, other things being equal. See NHTSA, supra note 10, § “Report Summary” §§ “Review 
of the Scientific Literature.” (which suggests that drivers are more motivated to perform well when driving 






subjects had never used a cell phone before the experiment.
109 Thus, it is not likely to be 
representative of the population of drivers that use cell phones while driving today.
110  
  Serafin et al. conducted a similar study.
111 They tested twelve individuals using 
manual and voice activated phones on a driving simulator.
112 
113 Serafin et al. concluded 
that voice-operated devices would be safer than hand-held phones because manual 
dialing was distracting. The authors write, “The main disturbance in driving performance 
was found during periods of dialing while driving. When driving and dialing, voice input 
led to better driving performance than the manual handset.”
114 Serafin et al. has many of 
the same limitations as Brookhius et al. The sample size is small and none of the subjects 
had used a cell phone before. Further, Serafin et al. uses a simulator instead of a real car. 
  While there is some evidence that dialing may be distracting, research suggests 
that conversation is at least as distracting. Three studies support this conclusion. 
McKnight and McKnight used a driving simulator to test 151 subjects in 47 different 
driving situations and five levels of distraction: no distraction, placing a call, simple 
conversation, complex conversation and tuning a radio.
115 The dialing task required using 
a keypad near the driver. The effects of distraction were measured in terms of delayed 
response time and missed responses. In terms of response time, McKnight and McKnight 
found that tuning a radio, dialing a number and having a complex conversation were all 
about equally distracting, while having a simple conversation was less distracting. 
                                                 
109 Furthermore, the subjects were composed of 10 males and 2 females. Such a large gender imbalance 
may be significant. See Brookhius et al., supra note 105, at 310. 
110 Using inexperienced drivers may have been helpful for testing if there is a difference between manual 
and automatic dialing while driving, but we believe experience using a cell phone and familiarity with that 
phone is likely to affect the risk of an accident. This assertion is seemingly supported by the study itself, 
which found that the drivers improved in some measures over the period of the experiment. See Id., at 309. 
Furthermore, the study, published in 1991, may be a little dated. Phones have changed physically, and the 
population, on average, is far more experienced with cell phones than the average person in 1991 or the 
subjects in the Brookhius et al. study. 
111 Colleen Serafin, Cathy Wen, Gretchen Paelke, and Paul Green, Car Phone Usability: A Human Factors 
Laboratory Test, Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 37
th Annual Meeting, 220-4 
(1993). 
112 The term “voice activated” means that at least some functions, such as dialing, can be performed by 
voice recognition software instead of by pushing physical buttons. Some authors equate voice activated and 
hands-free devices, but this is wrong. Hand-held devices may be voice activated while hands-free devices 
may not be. Some studies use the terms “voice operated” or “voice input,” which are the same as “voice 
activated.”  
113 Serafin et al., supra note 111, at 221. 
114 Id. at 222. Parenthetical remarks omitted. 
115 James McKnight and A. Scott McKnight, The Effect of Cellular Phone Use Upon Driver Attention, 
National Public Services Research Institute, (1991), at 






Measured by the number of missed cues, tuning the radio and complex conversation were 
about equal. They were both more distracting than dialing and simple conversations, 
which were also about equal. Thus, the study showed that dialing is a distraction, but not 
greater than conversation or tuning a radio.
116 In their conclusions, the authors state, “All 
forms of cellular phone usage lead to significant increases in the establishment of non-
response to highway-traffic situations and increase in time to respond.”
117  
The greatest distraction was not dialing, but complex conversation. “Complex, 
intense conversation leads to the greatest increases in likelihood of overlooking 
significant highway traffic conditions, and the time to respond to them. The distracting 
effect is similar to that of tuning a radio. The effect of placing calls or engaging in casual 
conversation is less of a problem, although, calling tends to retard responses.”
118 
McKnight and McKnight is a good study because the sample size was large and multiple 
distractions were compared. However, the authors relied on a driving simulator instead of 
a car, and the complex conversation task, which involved arithmetic and memory 
problems, may not be representative of real cell phone conversations. 
Lamble et al. used an experimental design similar to the Brookhius et al. study, 
but reached a different conclusion.
119 In Lamble, nineteen subjects drove behind a lead 
car under one of three conditions: dialing numbers on a keypad, performing a verbal task 
or driving with no distractions—the control situation. The lead car would randomly 
decelerate and the researchers measured the subjects’ reaction time. The results for the 
verbal and physical tasks were similar and both represented significant distractions 
compared with the control. The authors wrote, “The conclusion of the current study is 
that neither a hands-free phone option nor a voice-controlled interface removes the 
problem of driver performance impairment when using a mobile phone in the car.”
120 
This study is good because it tested the subjects in real cars under realistic driving 
conditions. Unfortunately, the sample size was small, and the authors only tested one 
element of driving performance. Although the verbal and physical tasks were analogous 
                                                 
116 The authors also found that age was a significant factor, with older drivers more affected than younger 
drivers. See Id., § “Effects of Age.” 
117 Id., § “Conclusions.” 
118 Id. 
119 Dave Lamble, Tatu Kauranen, Matti Laakso, Heikki Summala,  Cognitive Load and Detection 
Thresholds in Car Following Situations: Safety Implications for Using Mobile (Cellular) Telephones While 
Driving, 31, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION, 617-23 (1999). 






to actual use, they were somewhat contrived. The physical task required continuously 
dialing random numbers read by an experimenter—not dialing a well-known phone 
number. The verbal task involved simple addition, which may not be typical of cell phone 
conversations. 
The widely cited Redelmeier and Tibshirani study also examined the relative 
importance of dialing.
121 The epidemiological study compared the likelihood that a driver 
had been using her cell phone on the day of an accident with the likelihood that she was 
using the device on a previous day when she did not get in an accident.
122 Although the 
authors did not design the experiment to pinpoint the source of the distraction, they were 
able to conduct some analysis based on the information they collected. The authors 
wrote, “To examine potential safety advantages, we reanalyzed the data based only on 
incoming cellular telephone calls. The results showed a relative risk of 3.0 [compared to 
4.1 overall], suggesting that the act of dialing was not the main contributor to the 
observed association.”
123 Eliminating dialing from consideration did not significantly 
lower the risk associated with driving and using a cellular telephone.
124 
Although dialing does seem to pose some risk, it is not greater than the risk 
associated with conversation and may not be important. Furthermore, the distraction 
caused by dialing only supports a hands-free policy if it is assumed that most hand-held 
phones are manually dialed and most hands-free phones are voice-activated. 
Unfortunately, there is little data to support this assumption. Many hand-held phones can 
be converted to a hands-free phone with a wire attachment. In this case, whether or not 
the phone is voice activated is unrelated to whether it is hands-free or hand-held. 
Moreover, newer phones tend to have features that allow for voice activation and speed 
                                                 
121 See Redelmeier and Tibshirani, supra note 45. 
122 See also the explanation infra, Section III. 
123 Redelmeier and Tibshirani, supra note  47, at 7. This article describes the same study originally 
published in the NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (supra note 45). 
124 Another reason dialing may not matter much is because, in the real world, drivers can control when they 
dial. It is reasonable to assume they will choose a time that is less likely to result in a serious accident, such 
as when the car is stopped at a red light, when there are no other cars around or while driving a very 
familiar stretch of road. The NHTSA report addressed this issue, stating, “Subjective assessments by test 
participants indicate that they are generally aware of the demanding nature of manually dialing a cellular 
telephone. Many studies report driver behavior that resembles attempts to compensate for such disruptive 
effects (e.g., by slowing down).”
  (NHTSA, supra note  9, § “Report Summary,” §§ “Review of the 
Scientific Literature.”) The experimental studies described above do not allow drivers much freedom in this 
regard. This would imply that the experimental results would tend to overstate the risk of dialing in the real 






dialing. Also, dialing may be a minor cause of risk in epidemiological studies and crash 
data because dialing takes much less time than conversation. 
Other characteristics distinguish hand-held and hands-free devices that could 
result in different levels of risk. For example, a hand-held phone is held to your ear 
whereas a hands-free device typically is not, although the latter come in a variety of 
physical forms. How different designs affect risks has not been researched in detail. 
Indeed, no study has systematically compared actual hand-held and hands-free phones in 
a way that includes a wide variety of devices and aspects of use in realistic situations.
125 
Based on the evidence to date, however, there is no reason to believe that the physical 
manipulation of a hands-free device is any safer than the use of a hand-held phone. 
Recently, some very exciting work on comparing hand-held and hands-free 
devices has been performed by Strayer and his colleagues at the University of Utah. They 
have done a series of experiments to test the differences between hand-held and hands-
free devices and to measure conversation as a risk factor. In one experiment, 64 subjects 
performed a simulated driving task under one of four conditions: listening to the radio, 
listening to a book on tape, using a hand-held cell phone or using a hands-free cell 
phone.
126 The subjects conversed on the phones, but they did not dial them while 
performing the task. The subjects used a joystick to follow a cursor on a screen. When the 
cursor would flash red, the subject was to press a button on the joystick as fast as 
possible. The authors measured reaction time and the number of times the subject missed 
the cue altogether. Strayer and his colleagues aggregated the hands-free and hand-held 
data because there was no significant difference between the two phone types.
127 They 
wrote, “These data demonstrate that the phone conversation itself resulted in significant 
slowing in the response to simulated traffic signals, as well as an increase in the 
                                                 
125 For example, no study has considered the distraction caused by setting up a hands-free device like a 
headset (e.g., plugging it in to the phone, untangling the chord, etc.) or what happens when an earpiece falls 
out. 
126 Described in David L. Strayer and William A. Johnston, Driven to Distraction: Dual-Task Studies of 
Simulated Driving and Conversing on a Cellular Telephone, 12:6, PSYCHOL. SCI., 462-6 (November 2001), 
available at http://www.psych.utah.edu/AppliedCognitionLab/. Last visited Apr. 16, 2002. Also see David 
L. Strayer, Frank A. Drews, Robert W. Albert and William A. Johnston, Why do Cell Phone Conversations 
Interfere with Driving? (unpublished working paper, at http://www.psych.utah.edu/AppliedCognitionLab/. 
Last visited Apr. 16, 2002). Also see David L. Strayer, Frank A. Drews, Robert W. Albert and William A. 
Johnston, Cell Phone Induced Perceptual Impairments During Simulated Driving, (unpublished working 






likelihood of missing these signals. Moreover, the fact that the hand-held and hands-free 
cell phones resulted in equivalent dual-task deficits indicates that the interference was not 
due to peripheral factors such as holding the phone while conversing.”
128 This study was 
good because of the relatively large sample size and because the design allowed the 
authors to directly compare the two phone types. However, only one aspect of driving 
performance was measured. 
More evidence on comparing hands-free and hand-held devices comes from the 
epidemiological study performed by Redelmeier and Tibshirani.
129 Although the authors 
designed their study to test the overall risk posed by using cell phones and driving, they 
collected enough data to draw some conclusions about hands-free phones. Using their 
initial sample, they “analyzed the 148 who used a hands-free cellular telephone and 
obtained a relative risk of 5.9. This suggested that hands-free cellular telephones offered 
no large safety advantage and implied that the main factor in a collision was a driver’s 
limitations in attention rather than in dexterity. A false sense of security, however, could 
also have led people to have a liberal attitude toward hands-free cellular telephones and 
thereby to expose themselves to greater risk than if they had a hand-held cellular 
telephone.”
130 Besides the overall quality of the study, this result is important because it 
uses real data and therefore includes all relevant factors, such as set-up, and all relevant 
phone types. On the other hand, this study shows correlation and does not, by itself, 
prove causation. 
Anecdotal evidence further supports the idea that hands-free devices can be as 
physically distracting as hand-held phones. A New York Times article from July of 2001 
reviews several hands-free products, including headsets, car kits and built-in phone 
systems.
131 The reviewer noted that the poor audio quality made hands-free phones more 
distracting. “From my experience, none of the products I tried actually made it 
significantly less distracting to talk on a cell phone while driving. In many cases, I found 
myself straining so hard to hear the caller that there was no way I could have 
                                                                                                                                                 
127 There was no difference between the book on tape and the radio, either. Both phone categories were 
more distracting than the control conditions, which represented a negligible distraction. See Strayer and 
Johnston, supra note 126, at 464. 
128 Id. 
129 See Redelmeier and Tibshirani, supra note 123. 
130 Id., at 7. The relative risk for using any type of cell phone was 4.1. 






concentrated on the road.”
132 She also wrote, “Moreover, answering a call with many of 
these hands-free gadgets requires more fumbling than just flipping open a phone—and 
the more complicated the technology gets, the more likely drivers are to take their eyes 
off the road.”
133 Even the cutting-edge, built-in hands-free phones available in some 
luxury cars, while offering a few advantages, were potentially distracting. The reviewer 
reports that “even these systems aren’t necessarily the key to safe driving. Just watching a 
demo in a parked vehicle, I was overwhelmed by all the digital readouts across the 
dashboard screen (imagine reading your Palm while driving) and the commands that need 
to be mastered simply to place or answer a call—never mind troubleshooting the system 
on a crowded highway if something goes wrong.”
134 While technology is likely to 
change, these examples add further support to the view that hands-free phones can be 
expected to introduce physical distractions comparable to hand-held devices. More 
importantly, the results of the experimental studies described below strongly suggest that 
even crystal clear audio and effortless controls would not substantially reduce distraction. 
Even very user-friendly phones will be distracting because conversation itself is 
distracting. There is an emerging consensus that talking while driving puts a strain on the 
mind that is significant regardless of device. Mental distraction can lead to a deterioration 
of driving performance. Although the mechanism is not understood, conversation may 
reduce a driver’s ability to process visual information. The fact that mentally intense 
conversation impairs driving performance more than easy conversation further supports 
the idea that mental factors are an important part of distraction. 
Conversation itself has been shown to have a detrimental effect on driving 
performance. Two studies illustrate this point. One study, conducted by Strayer and his 
colleagues, used a driving simulator to test response time and the risk of accidents.
135 
Forty subjects were required to follow a pace car that would randomly brake. The 
subjects had to respond and the researchers recorded reaction time, collisions with the 
pace car and other data. There were two driving conditions and each subject drove for 
half of the time with a cell phone.
136 The cell phone was a hands-free design that was 




135 See Strayer  et al., Why do Cell Phone Conversations Interfere with Driving? supra note  126, § 
“Experiment 2.” 






positioned and adjusted before the driving task began. There was no dialing or any other 
physical manipulation of the phone required during the experiment. Any physical 
distraction present in this experiment would be the least distracting scenario drivers are 
likely to encounter in the real world.
137 Yet, while using the cell phone, subjects were 
more likely to have a collision and were slower to begin braking, even though they had, 
without instruction, increased their following distance.
138 The authors concluded, “Thus, 
conversing on a hands-free cell phone impaired driving performance and this impairment 
became more pronounced as driving difficulty increased.”
139 Even  with a hands-free 
phone that requires minimal physical manipulation, there is still distraction.  
Another study was performed by the Insurance Corporation of British 
Columbia.
140 Researchers tested 41 subjects in real cars on a special course. Subjects 
encountered three traffic situations: a stoplight, a lateral maneuver around pop-up targets 
and a left turn. During half of the trials, the subjects simulated hands-free conversation by 
responding to questions posed by an audiotape. The yes/no questions required subjects to 
give the definition of a word or the size of a named object. The researchers measured 
acceleration/deceleration, reaction time and other variables of driving performance.
141 
The results were mixed. The drivers responded to the traffic light by driving more 
conservatively, but performance suffered in the lateral maneuver and the left turn. This 
study is noteworthy for several reasons. The subjects drove real cars, were given 
incentives to do well and were tested on three different traffic situations. Most 
importantly, by not using an actual phone, the experimental design eliminated any 
physical distraction, allowing researchers to isolate the impact of conversation.  
Unfortunately, the study did not include any other distraction for comparison.
142  
However, it provides one more piece of evidence that conversation itself hurts driving 
performance. 
                                                 
137 According to the authors, “Thus, any dual-task interference that we observed must be due to the cell 
phone conversation itself, because there was no manual manipulation of the cell phone during the dual-task 
portions of the study.” Id., § “General Discussion,” §§ “Procedure.” 
138 This behavior is consistent with the offsetting behavior modeled by Peltzman and remarked on by 
NHTSA. See Peltzman, supra note 99 and note regarding NHTSA, supra note 124. 
139 See Strayer  et al., Why do Cell Phone Conversations Interfere with Driving?, supra note  126, § 
“Experiment 2,” §§ “Results and Discussion.” 
140 See ICBC, supra note 56. 
141 Id., § 2. 
142 Although the sample size was larger than some studies cited above, there were 30 males and only 11 






The mechanism by which mental distraction caused by conversation affects 
responsiveness of drivers is not understood, but two studies suggest that conversation 
interferes with the brain’s ability to fully process visual information. Recarte and Nunes 
focused on how drivers can be distracted by conversation.
143 The authors studied the eye 
movements of twelve subjects as they drove under different conditions in Spain. While 
driving, the subjects were asked to perform a mental imaging task, a verbal task or no 
task.
144 The authors found that the verbal task reduced the driver’s functional visual field, 
although less than the spatial-imaging task. The functional visual field is a measure of 
what the subject actually notices from the data gathered by the eyes.
145 If a subject’s 
functional visual field is decreased, then he is more likely not to notice a significant 
object, like a stop sign, and therefore is more likely to have an accident. The study is not 
conclusive because the sample size is small and the exact relationships between eye 
movements, the functional visual field, driver attention and the likelihood of an accident 
are not fully known.
146 Nonetheless, the study helps to explain why conversation, 
regardless of the exact physical nature of the device, can be dangerous.  
An experiment performed by Strayer and his colleagues used a different approach 
to understand how conversation distracts drivers.
147 Twenty-eight subjects were shown 
two similar images of street scenes, flashed in rapid succession. The pictures were 
identical except for one element, such as the presence or absence of a stop sign. The 
                                                 
143 Miguel A. Recarte and Luis M. Nunes, Effects of Verbal and Spatial Imagery Tasks on Eye Fixations 
While Driving, 6,  J. E XPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOL.: A PPLIED, 31-43 (March 2000). Available at 
http://www.apa.org/journals/xap/xap6131.html. Last visited Apr. 17, 2002. 
144 The spatial imagery task required the subjects to visualize letters of the alphabet and answer certain 
questions about them. For example, does a lower case “a” contain a closed area? The verbal task required 
subjects to name words that started with a letter given by the experimenter. For example, give words that 
start with the letter “b.” The authors recorded data about pupil size, the location of eye fixation and the 
duration of fixation. These data are related to the functional visual field, which is related to driver attention.  
Id., § “Methods.” 
145 According to the authors, “However, in ordinary activity, both attention and eye movements usually go 
together so that in a complex activity such as driving, it seems justified to interpret a change in visual 
inspection patterns as an indicator of a change in the assignment of spatial attention.” Id., § “Abstract.” 
146 The authors write, “With regard to the implications for driving, the  spatial reduction of the visual 
inspection window, including the reduction of the inspection of mirrors, could be interpreted as a predictor 
of decreased probability of detecting traffic events, particularly when performing mental spatial-imagery 
tasks. However, considering the limitations of interpreting eye movements in terms of attention, this cannot 
simply be assumed. The issue of whether the narrowing of the visual inspection window causes loss of 
peripheral visual capacity and visual information processing (peripheral or otherwise) remains open.” Id., § 
“Discussion.” 
147 Jason S. McCarley, Margaret Vais, Heather Pringle, Arthur F. Kramer, David E. Irwin and David L. 
Strayer, Conversation Disrupts Visual Scanning of Traffic Scenes, (unpublished working paper), at 






subjects had to identify the change, while the experimenters kept time and monitored the 
subjects’ eye movements. Half of the trials required the subjects to speak to a researcher 
in another room via a clip-on microphone.
148 Since the subjects were not required to dial, 
hold or physically manipulate the phone in any way, the effects of conversation could be 
isolated. While conversation did not affect the average time to find the changed element, 
subjects missed the change more often and searched less efficiently while engaged in 
conversation.
149 According to the authors, the “results demonstrate that even simple 
conversation can disrupt attentive scanning and representation of a visual scene.”
150 In 
other words, conversation, regardless of the physical device, affects the way a driver’s 
brain processes visual information and presumably hurts driver performance.
151 
The conclusion that conversation is distracting is further enforced by the 
observation that more mentally taxing conversation leads to greater distraction. 
McKnight and McKnight tested subjects on a driving simulator with two intensity levels 
of conversation: casual conversation about personal topics and problems involving 
arithmetic and memory.
152 The more complex conversation increased reaction time and 
the percentage of missed cues compared to the simple conversation.
153 Strayer and 
Johnston produced similar results in a different experiment.
154 The subjects were tested 
on an easy and difficult course using a simulator with three different tasks--no task, an 
easy verbal task and a difficult verbal task. The easy verbal task involved shadowing--the 
experimenter would say a word and the subject would repeat it. The difficult verbal task 
involved word-generation--the experimenter would give the subject a word and the 
subject would give a different word that began with the last letter of the word given by 
the experimenter. The driving simulation involved following a cursor on a screen with a 
joystick.
155 The authors found that the word-generation task caused more errors in the 
                                                 
148 Id., § “Method.” 
149 Id., § “Results.” 
150 Id., § “Discussion.” 
151 Brookhius et al. also supports the assertion that both phone types are equally taxing on the brain. The 
experimenters measured mental workload by recording heart rate and by asking subjects to evaluate their 
mental effort. According to the authors: “No effect of type of telephone was apparent, indicating that the 
physical difference between handheld versus hands-free has no influence on [mental] workload.” 
Brookhius et al., supra note 105, at 314. 
152 See McKnight and McKnight, supra note 55 and further discussion of the experiment in Section III of 
this paper. 
153 McKnight and McKnight, supra note 55, § “Results,” §§ “Effects of Distractions.” 
154 Strayer and Johnston, supra note 126. 






driving simulation than the shadowing task or control, and that this effect was stronger 
for the difficult course than for the easy course.
156 In other words, mentally challenging 
verbal tasks required more attention and caused more distraction. And since the verbal 
task, and not any physical aspect of the driver’s immediate environment, was the only 
variable, conversation itself can cause distraction. 
Taken together, the studies described in this section provide little support for the 
view that hands-free phones will be significantly safer. There does seem to be some risk 
from manually dialing a phone, but this risk is no greater than the risk posed by 
conversation. And since even a short conversation will tend to be longer than the time it 
takes to dial, focusing on dialing misses an important part of the problem.  
The primary reason hands-free phones will not reduce risk significantly is because 
conversation, on any type of device, is a significant distraction. Conversation impairs 
driving performance, apparently by reducing the driver’s ability to fully comprehend 
visual information. Since hands-free phones will still allow conversation, a major part--if 
not the major part--of the risk associated with calling and driving will remain. 
 
B. Crash Data Do Not Support the Use of Hands-Free Devices 
 
The conclusion that hands-free telephones are just as unsafe as hand-held phones 
is further supported by crash data.
157 NHTSA conducted an extensive literature review of 
studies involving cell phones and driving.
158 NHTSA also analyzed two databases, the 
Fatal Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and the National Automotive Sampling System 
(NASS).
159 Both databases are funded by NHTSA. The NASS program uses police crash 
reports and also employs independent investigators to gather additional information. The 
FARS database includes police crash reports, medical records and other driver records. 
Despite recent attempts to monitor crashes related to cell phone use, both the FARS and 
NASS suffer from very significant undercounting and unrepresentative sampling. Only 
two states, Oklahoma and Minnesota, specifically asked for information about cell 
phones in police crash reports when NHTSA performed their study. That number has 
now increased to sixteen, but a thorough study of the enlarged data set has not been 
                                                 
156 Id. 
157 The key findings from the crash data are summarized in Table A-2 in the Appendix. 
158 See NHTSA, supra note 10.  







160 The data that exist indicate, unsurprisingly, that cell phones are a 
significant factor in auto crashes. However, “specific aspects of cellular telephone use 
have been identified which demonstrate that phone conversation rather than dialing is the 
most frequently reported related factor. Contrary to expectations, the majority of drivers 
were talking on their telephones rather than dialing at the time of the crash.”
161 
NHTSA also studied crash data from North Carolina. Although North Carolina 
does not specifically ask for data related to cell phones, the state maintains a searchable 
database of written descriptions. By searching for words like “phone,” the NHTSA 
collected and analyzed crash narratives related to portable electronic devices for five 
(nonconsecutive) years. Of the nearly 100 crashes related to cell phones, fewer than 10% 
could be attributed to dialing.
162 In fact, the crashes were spread among several different 
actions, including answering a phone, retrieving a dropped phone and moving to the side 
of the road for better reception. The NHTSA concludes that this range of causal factors 
related to cell phone use “highlights the relative importance of conversation itself as an 
important causal factor.”
163 
Like the NASS and FARS data, the North Carolina system is flawed. There is a 
bias towards undercounting incidents and little guidance for police officers to provide 
truly useful information. Moreover, the three states with the best data do not necessarily 
reflect trends in the entire country, and the North Carolina data is somewhat dated. Some 
critics have also suggested that fear of liability causes drivers to lie about their use of cell 
phones.
164 Notwithstanding the weaknesses in the U.S. crash data, they are consistent 
with the other research reviewed here. 
Crash data from across the Pacific, however, seem to contradict the research 
described in this section. In 1999, the Japanese Diet banned the use of hand-held cell 
phones while driving.
165 The year after this ban went into effect, there was a marked 
decline in cell phone related accidents compared to the year previous to the ban. The 
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number of accidents related to cell phone use declined from 2,830 to 1,351, a remarkable 
decline of over 50%.
166 This is significant, but there are reasons to think the results might 
be different in the U.S.
167 For example, the breakdown by activity, such as dialing and 
conversing, is very different in Japan, based on available data. Dialing seems to be a 
much more common activity at the time of the accident for drivers in Japan, although the 
reasons for this are unknown.
168 The data from Japan needs to be thoroughly analyzed, as 
do any possible differences between American and Japanese drivers. So far, this analysis 
has not been done. 
 
C. General Reviews Suggest that the Case for Hands-Free Cell Phones Has Not Been 
Made 
 
Researchers who have surveyed the U.S. crash data, epidemiological and 
experimental studies are in wide agreement—there is no evidence that hands-free devices 
are safer.
169 Lissy et al. conducted a literature review as well as an original analysis of the 
comparative risk of using cell phones while driving. The authors did not cover the issue 
of hands-free devices in depth, but did conclude that “it is not clear whether hands-free 
cellular phone designs are significantly safer than hand-held designs, since it may be that 
conversation per se rather than dialing/handling is responsible for most of the attributable 
risk due to cellular phone use while driving.”
170 
The Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones, a British group commissioned 
to study the health effects of cell phones in all facets of life, and make recommendations 
to government, reached a similar conclusion.
171 The Group reviewed studies on the 
dangers of cell phone use while driving and decided that a ban that applied only to hand-
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held devices made little sense.
172 A key finding was that “current experimental evidence 
suggests there is little or no justification for the assumption that the detrimental effects of 
phone use on driving are ameliorated by hands-free operation, a conclusion supported by 
the limited epidemiological evidence relevant to this question (Redelmeier and 
Tibshirani, 1997). There is therefore no strong empirical justification at present for the 
enactment of a policy or legislation that differentiates between the use of hand-held and 
hands-free phone sets in motor vehicles.”
173  
Cain and Burris also reviewed a set of studies for the Center for Urban 
Transportation Research report.
174 While the authors found that dialing was a distraction, 
they also concluded that conversation itself was the largest danger. “Research suggests 
that hands-free use is less dangerous than hand-held use due to the removal of ‘physical 
distraction’ while placing and receiving calls. However, research comparisons of hand-
held and hands-free phones show that there is little difference in risk during the act of 
conversation due to the continued presence of a mental distraction.”
175  
In addition to believing that a hand-held ban will do little to reduce the risk 
associated with driving and using a cell phone, several reviewers have conjectured that a 
hand-held ban could increase the overall level of risk.
176 By banning only hand-held 
units, lawmakers may send consumers the wrong message; people m ay believe that 
hands-free devices are safe and use them more often, or with less caution. This would 
increase risk associated with hands-free units and may offset or even eclipse gains in 
safety from banning hand-held phones.   
According to the NHTSA study, “…hands-free designs will do nothing to 
mitigate the distraction potential of cellular telephone conversation. Proposed legislation 
may inadvertently promote greater use of cellular telephones among drivers who 
currently limit or altogether avoid cellular telephone use while driving by implying that 
hands-free designs must be safe, thus increasing exposure to other potential risks that 
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177 The authors later elaborate on this point. While a hands-free policy 
might increase the safety of each individual driver or for each individual call, the 
population risk would likely increase on the whole because more people may place calls 
or talk for longer.
178 According to NHTSA, “Where hands-free architectures are 
legislatively mandated, such an outcome would likely take place over time.”
179 
180 While 
there are no existing studies that suggest risk would increase, policy makers should be 
aware that this is a distinct possibility.  
A reduction in a specific risk and an increase in overall risk is the sort of 
counterintuitive and counterproductive outcome we might expect from the regulation of a 
very small risk. So it should not be surprising if it were to be the outcome from 
mandating a technology that represents a minimal safety advantage over what is currently 
used. Sunstein has argued that if a risk is very small--a so-called de minimis risk--then 
that risk should not be regulated.
181 By analogy, if a technology cannot be shown with 
some reasonable certainty to reduce risks by more than a de minimis amount, then that 
technology should not be required. Mandating hands-free phones while driving is such a 
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de minimis risk reduction. While hands-free phones may reduce physical distractions, 
they will do nothing to reduce the mental distractions which are at least as significant. 
All the evidence suggests that hands-free devices are barely, if at all, safer than 
hand-held ones. The experimental and epidemiological studies show that manual dialing 
is distracting, but no more so than conversation. Other physical distractions, such as 
holding the phone, do not appear to be significant.  
  
V. Cell Phone Regulation is Both Easy and Hard to Explain 
 
  In previous sections, we showed that economic analysis does not support a 
blanket  ban on using cell phones while driving. We also showed that the scientific 
literature on hands-free devices suggests that they will provide few, if any, safety 
advantages, and could actually increase overall risks. Yet, there is great legislative 
interest in regulating cell phones in cars. Moreover, proposals to ban hand-held cell 
phones and allow hands-free devices are the most popular. What explains this disconnect 
between policy analysis and policy proposals?  
The easy answer is that widespread popular support for regulation exists and that 
lawmakers are merely responding to public opinion. While this may be true, we suspect 
that many individuals are of two minds about this issue. They like the freedom of being 
able to use their cell phones while driving, but are concerned about the increased risks. 
Moreover, to the extent that there is public support for some kind of government 
intervention, it is worth exploring why such support exists, and why politicians have 
responded in the way they have. The answers to these puzzles can be found, in part, by 
drawing on different literatures in psychology, political science and economics. 
The movement to regulate cellular phones in cars does tap into a real public 
opinion. A Quinnipiac University poll, released shortly before the hand-held ban was 
passed, found that 87% of New Yorkers favored such a restriction.
182 The same poll 
found New Jersey voters favored a hand-held ban 86 to 12 percent and Connecticut 
voters favored one 85 to 14 percent.
183 Of New Yorkers who owned a cell phone, 85% 
supported a hand-held ban.
184 Support was widespread across geographic region, age and 
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185 Another poll found that 59% of Texans think using a cell phone while driving 
should be illegal.
186 An online poll conducted by NHTSA found that 74% of respondents 
were in favor of restricting the use of cell phones while driving.
187 The results of the 
online poll should be viewed skeptically, however, because the sample was not random. 
For comparison, 75% of Finnish drivers interviewed thought the government should 
regulate the use of cell phones while driving.
188 
Politicians are responding to the public’s concerns. Since not all ideas that are 
popular with the public generate this many proposals, the issue must have political 
traction as well. Individual politicians may see this issue as a way to develop a political 
reputation that will increase their chances of being reelected or allow them to be elected 
to a higher office.
189 The idea behind the legislation is concrete and easy to understand. 
Furthermore, automobile safety is an important concern for a large majority of voters. 
There is already considerable media attention and public awareness of the issue. In the 
case of a ban on hand-held devices, lawmakers can be seen as trying to do something that 
is not too costly and is perceived by the public to have some value, even if it is not 
supported by the science.
190 
191 Indeed, if the policy is not enforced, or enforced only 
minimally, it may have little impact on safety or costs.
192 Such a policy may still give the 
public the feeling that something is being done to improve safety. 
Opinion polling suggests that the public’s assessment of the risk from using cell 
phones is quite high. For example, according to the Quinnipiac poll discussed above, 
44% of New Yorkers think that a hand-held ban would make the roads of New York a 
“great deal” safer. Only 13% thought that the impact would be “not much” or “nothing at 
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193 Since cell phone usage is associated with, at most, about 3% of fatalities, the 
public appears to be significantly overestimating the dangers of using a cell phone and 
driving.
194  
Psychological research suggests that risk perception can be influenced by factors 
other than the actual magnitude of the risk and some of those factors appear to be present 
in the case of cell phones.
195 For example, the so-called “availability bias” appears to be a 
very significant factor.
196 This bias notes how people frequently place too much emphasis 
on available information in framing an issue. Thus, people tend to overestimate risks that 
they can see and remember easily.
197 This effect is compounded when the victims are 
identifiable, which is generally the case for car crashes, and the incident is widely 
reported in the media.
198 Anecdotal evidence like this seems to be a major factor in 
shaping public opinion and inspiring regulation. 
  In 1996, New York State Assemblyman Felix Ortiz was driving near his Brooklyn 
district office when he witnessed a car drive erratically and strike a pole. Stopping to 
help, he learned that the woman had been using a cell phone at the time of the accident. 
Later that year, Ortiz introduced the first proposal to ban talking and driving in New 
York.
199 He has reintroduced it every year since and was finally rewarded in 2001 when 
New York passed a modified version of his bill.
200 In 2000, John and Carole Hall were 
struck and killed by Jason Jones in Maryland. Suffolk County, the home of the Hall 
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family, was shocked and soon passed a hand-held ban. Jon Cooper, the legislator who 
wrote the bill, is quoted as saying, “Hopefully, it will heal the wound.”
201  
In 1991, Massachusetts State Representative Salvatore DiMasi proposed 
restrictions on cell phones after an incident in his district where a driver using a cell 
phone ran a mother and her children off the road. The bill died, but DiMasi was looking 
to revive the effort in 2001. According to DiMasi, “Ten years later, more people use cell 
phones and I don’t know anyone who hasn’t been cut off by someone talking or dialing 
on a cell phone.”
202 
Lisa Liss, author of the Brookline, Massachusetts ordinance echoed that 
sentiment. Liss was nearly struck by a talking driver who swerved into her lane. Liss 
says, “I repeated this story to several of my friends and almost all of them had either read 
about a near-accident or tragedy or experienced the same thing. And that brought it into 
my consciousness—if this is happening just among my small friends and acquaintances, 
it must be multiplied across the country.”
203 
204  
  Two slightly different stories have been reported as the catalyst of the hand-held 
ban in Brooklyn, Ohio. According to one, the inspiration came from an accident 
witnessed by the former police chief in which a driver talking on a cell phone ran a red 
light and was broadsided.
205 According to the other, Brooklyn police officer Rick Hovan 
initially pushed for the ban after his best friend was nearly run over by a driver using a 
cell phone.
206 Hovan, who wrote about 285 tickets in the first thirteen months of the ban, 
is a strong proponent of the restricting the use of cell phones by drivers. Hovan is 
motivated by the most famous victim of a cell phone related accident, Morgan Lee Pena. 
He often writes her initials on cell phone tickets or includes a picture of her with the 
citation.
207 
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  In November of 1999, two year-old Morgan Lee Pena was killed when a driver 
talking on a cell phone ran a stop sign.
208 Patti Pena, Morgan Lee’s mother, has become a 
vocal leader in the movement to restrict the use of phones by drivers. She founded 
Advocates for Cell Phone Safety and maintains a web site.
209 She has appeared on TV 
shows, including Oprah, where she met Hovan.
210 Pena has also lobbied legislators, 
especially at the local level in her native Pennsylvania.
211 Hilltown, where the accident 
occurred, passed an ordinance within two months.
212 Pena also spoke before the town 
council of Lebanon, which also passed a ban.
213 Pena also wrote a well-publicized letter 
to Tom and Ray Magliozzi, co-hosts of National Public Radio’s “Car Talk.” 
The Magliozzis are strong proponents of regulating the use of cell phones by 
drivers. They give away free “Drive Now, Talk Later” bumper stickers, maintain a Web 
site, write opinion pieces for newspapers and discuss the issue on their radio show.
214 
Although they reference some studies, the Magliozzis largely base their analysis of the 
risk posed by cell phones on intuition. “Driving and talking is dangerous. We know it. 
You know it.”
215 In a piece written for the San Jose Mercury News, they wrote, “A short 
drive around any city or town provides more than enough evidence for most of us that 
cell phone use and other forms of driver distraction are threatening the safety of anyone 
who ventures on or near our roads.”
216  
Risk perception can also be influenced by the perceived benefits. If the benefits 
appear to be small or are hard to perceive, then people tend to overestimate the risk.
217 
While the impact of using a cell phone on driving performance is easily observed, the 
reasons for a driver’s call are not. Nor are calls to emergency services that would not be 
made if the driver did not have a cell phone.
218 Some people seem to believe that it is 
simply unnecessary to use a cell phone while driving. The Magliozzi brothers are very 
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critical of the idea that cell phones have any legitimate purpose for drivers beside 
emergency situations.
219 Furthermore, they are very judgmental of anyone who uses their 
phone while driving. On their Web site they write, “Sick and tired of having your life 
endangered by drivers who are too self-important to put their phones down and pay 
attention to the road?”
220 They also describe using a phone while driving as “immoral, 
unethical, inconsiderate and downright stupid.”
221 And while the victims are identified as 
real people with names and families, the villain is some nameless “moron talking to his 
broker on a cell phone.”
222 
The Magliozzi brothers also touch on  the issue of distribution when they ask, 
“Sick and tired of having your life endangered by drivers who are too self-important to 
put their phones down and pay attention to the road?”
223 Proponents of regulation may 
see drivers who use cell phones as endangering the safety of non-calling drivers for a 
benefit that only the caller experiences. A ban on cell phones would do the opposite, 
benefiting all drivers but only imposing a cost on those drivers who use a mobile phone 
while driving. This is true, of course, although a person is more likely to die as a 
pedestrian struck by a car than as a driver killed by another driver using a cell phone.
224 
Furthermore, the distribution of costs and benefits may or may not be a major force 
behind public opinion. In the Quinnipiac poll, the percentage of cell phone owners 
supporting a ban was virtually identical to the percentage of the overall population (85% 
vs. 87%).
225 It is possible that the cell phone owners who support a ban are mostly those 
owners who rarely or never use a phone while driving, but a significant number of 
supporters of regulation must also use their phone at least sometimes.
226 
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A risk may also be overestimated if it is new or unfamiliar.
227 The recent 
explosion in the number of cell phones in the U.S. may have given the public the 
impression that the problem is larger than it is. The public has also been concerned about 
the possible health effects of radiation from cell phones and cellular transmission towers, 
even though the evidence suggests that such fears are greatly exaggerated.
228 Cell phones 
have also been banned at many gas stations because of an unsubstantiated claim that the 
devices can cause explosions.
229 While using a cellular phone while driving does pose a 
risk, it seems the risk may be exaggerated in the public mind because it is new. 
We should also ask why a significant number of people want to restrict the use of 
phones while driving even though they themselves engage in the practice.
 230 One could 
explain people’s apparent contradictory wishes to have cell phones regulated at the same 
time they admit to using them while driving in three ways. One explanation is that we can 
think of an individual as having conflicting wishes. A part of the individual may wish to 
have a ban imposed on them, but absent a ban, that individual is unable to control the 
desire to use a cell phone. This idea has been discussed and modeled in economics.
231 
The idea is that people need some kind of commitment mechanism to help assure their 
desired behavior.  
An alternative explanation relates to the tragedy of the commons.
232 There is only 
a very small gain to me from refraining from using a cell phone while driving, if I am the 
only one to do so. In this case, this small gain is likely to pale in comparison to the 
benefits of actually using a cell phone while driving.
233 If, however, restrictions on cell 
phone use while driving are put on all individuals, that solution may be preferable for a 
large majority of people. 
Still another possibility is that an individual believes that she can drive and talk 
safely, but that other drivers are not as capable. If everyone could drive and talk safely, 
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then regulation would not be needed; but it is needed because others are not as careful.
234 
A very similar logic appears in an op-ed written by Tom and Ray Magliozzi, advocating 
the regulation of cell phones while driving. “Do we trust all drivers to know when enough 
alcohol is enough? Of course not. Laws are necessary, since we can’t trust everybody’s 
judgment.”
235  
If most drivers significantly overestimate their own ability to drive and use a cell 
phone safely compared to the actual risk, then regulation may be needed to correct this 
market failure. Drivers do seem, however, to recognize the risk to at least some degree.
236 
If most drivers compensate appropriately for the risk of using a cell phone while driving, 
but think wrongly that other drivers do not, then they may overestimate the benefits of 
regulation. The point is that regulation may be justified on efficiency grounds if 
overconfidence leads drivers to underestimate the risk of using a phone. If, however, 
drivers correctly understand the risk and merely have unjustifiably low expectations of 
their fellow drivers, then regulation may not improve efficiency. 
  Besides lawmakers and the public, the other major player in legislative decisions 
is the cellular industry. The response by companies in the cell phone business has been, 
for the most part, predictable.
237 Many companies have endorsed the safe use of cell 
phones, particularly while driving. This is essentially a “no-brainer”.
238 Using a standard 
self-interest model, one would expect wireless companies to oppose a ban on cell phone 
use while driving.
239 
240 The expected position regarding the requirement of hands-free 
devices while driving is harder to predict. Hands-free devices raise the direct and indirect 
cost of making wireless calls, and thus should reduce demand for such calls.
241 Therefore, 
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240 Companies that are competitors to wireless could support a total ban, unless they believed that a total 
ban would reduce their profits as well because cellular calls complement their business (e.g., land line 
calls). 
241 Direct costs include the monetary costs of purchasing the hand set. There are also indirect costs in terms 
of the time spent making the purchase and the time spent attaching the device. See Hahn et al., supra note, 






one would expect companies in the business to oppose their mandated use. At the same 
time, if the direct economic costs to a company are small, they could be dwarfed by the 
public relations benefits associated with supporting a ban on the use of hand-held cell 
phones while driving.
242  
The wireless industry has been promoting safety through flyers stuffed in monthly 
bills, signs in stores, print and broadcast ads since at least 1997. However, the industry 
seems to have been caught off guard by the hand-held ban passed in Brooklyn, Ohio 
since there was no attempt to lobby against the measure.
243 Industry representatives did 
lobby against a hand-held restriction in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, but the ban passed 
anyway. For Aspen, Colorado, the local cellular companies coordinated a media blitz and 
sent several representatives to the town council meeting the night of the vote. The Aspen 
ban was defeated.
244 
  While the wireless industry has consistently supported consumer education and 
further research, there is some disagreement over requiring the use of hands-free devices. 
The Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association, the largest industry group, 
continues to oppose regulation. But in the fall of 2000, Verizon broke ranks with the rest 
of the industry and declared its support for a hand-held ban in New York, as long as 
hands-free models were allowed.
245 According to a Verizon spokesman, “This is the way 
things seem to be going, and we want to be proactive in promoting responsible driving. 
You can’t have, as we’re starting to get, a patchwork of ordinances that are more 
confusing to motorists than if there were no laws on the books at all.”
246 A cellular phone 
retailer from New York, GLM Wireless Communications, expressed another reason for 
supporting a ban, “Any negative press that cellular phones get as far as the safety factor 
hurts sales in the long run.”
247  
  One way of being seen as proactive is to give away or subsidize hands-free 
devices, such as hands-free earpieces. To show support for ban on hand-held devices, 
GLM and another local retailer announced they would give away 10,000 hands-free 
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devices to New York drivers.
248  After the ban was passed, Verizon offered a 20% 
discount on all hands-free accessories in the New York area. AT&T now includes a 
hands-free earpiece with all phone purchases. Sprint touts its voice-activated dialing.
249 
  These companies may see a hand-held ban as a safe compromise, particularly if 
they believe some further regulation is inevitable. As the GLM executive quoted above 
says, bad publicity about the safety of cell phones could hurt sales, even if no laws are 
passed. Therefore, a protracted battle  may not be in the best interests of cellular 
companies.   
A hand-held ban could help preserve the reputation of cellular companies while 
appeasing many of their critics at a relatively low cost. Indeed, if a cellular firm endorses 
a ban and is seen as actively promoting safety, it could improve its image and have a 
positive impact on its bottom line. And some companies could profit from selling hands-
free equipment. 
  We have shown in this section that some features of cell phone policy can be 
explained relatively easily. Yet, perhaps because we are policy analysts, we are still 
struck by the disconnect between policy analysis and actual policy. The economics and 
science on this issue are fairly clear: a total ban does not seem to be justified on economic 
grounds and the effectiveness of hands-free devices in reducing motor vehicle accidents 
is unclear. Yet, the law is moving in the opposite direction. 
  In addition to the reasons for this disconnect highlighted above, we think that 
there are two other possibilities that should not be ignored. One possibility is that the 
economists and the scientists are wrong. We think this is unlikely, especially in the case 
of hands-free devices. Another possibility is that the problem could easily get worse in 
the future, as more people use cell phones while driving. People may be reacting to these 
possibilities and adopting the view that something needs to be done and this seems like a 




The regulation of cell phones while driving clearly  illustrates the disconnect 
between law and policy analysis. The disconnect arises largely because the political 
                                                 






process is more responsive to the public’s perception of risk than the scientists’ risk 
assessments and the economists’ policy analyses. Consequently, lawmakers are 
advocating both inefficient and ineffective regulatory options while ignoring important 
aspects of the problem. If cell phones represented an isolated example, there would be 
little cause for concern. Unfortunately, the problem is more general and therefore 
demands that policy makers consider new institutions for addressing potential biases in 
decision making.  
One key disconnect is between the public’s perception of the risk and the likely 
size of the risk. Incidents involving cellular phones and driving have received much 
attention while other distractions, like eating or tuning the radio, have not—perhaps 
because cell phones are relatively new. Calling attention to the risk posed by cell phones 
has probably led the public and some politicians to overestimate the risk, thus leading to a 
spate of legislative proposals.
250 Epidemiological and experimental studies, together with 
crash data, indicate that while the risk is real, it is comparable to more mundane risks that 
are unregulated.
251  
Moreover, it is not clear whether driver use of cell phones represents a significant 
market failure. Absent a significant failure, it is difficult to justify most regulatory 
proposals on economic efficiency grounds.
252  253 Since drivers seem to recognize the 
distracting nature of cell phones and compensate by driving more cautiously, they may 
already be making economically efficient choices.
254  
At the same time, if drivers impose a substantial risk on other drivers and 
passengers, it should not be ignored. However, the risk imposed by drivers using their 
cell phones on other drivers is smaller than the risk imposed by drivers on pedestrians or 
by drivers of large trucks on other drivers.
255 The basic point is that the cell phone 
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250 Forty-four percent of New Yorkers think a ban on hand-held cell phones will make the roads a “great 
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problem may not be terribly important in terms of losses in economic efficiency or 
relative risk, and this needs to be factored into the policy response. 
A review of the best available science and economics highlights the nature of the 
disconnect with current legislative proposals. The three studies examining this issue have 
found that costs probably exceed benefits and that a ban on the use of cellular phones 
would be a rather expensive way to improve safety in automobiles.
256 Yet, the number of 
states and local jurisdictions proposing bans on cell phones is increasing.
257  
The disconnect between policy analysis and law is even sharper for hand-held 
bans, which have been proposed more often than any other type of legislation.
258 There is 
a clear, emerging consensus that such a policy represents a very small safety gain or none 
at all.
259  
Lawmakers are either misinformed about the safety benefits of hands-free 
devices, or see the issue as a low cost way of gaining public support. At least some firms 
in the cellular industry have also endorsed a mandate for hands-free devices, probably 
because it will not hurt business too much, or it could even help if the firm’s public image 
improves. Unfortunately, a hands-free mandate will not provide significant safety gains 
for the public. 
There are other policies that make more sense. Since drivers seem to be at least 
partially aware of the distraction caused by cell phones and have a strong incentive to 
avoid crashes, a consumer information campaign may be an effective way of 
discouraging use, especially for low-value calls. Stricter enforcement of reckless driving 
laws or stricter penalties for accidents when a cell phone is involved may have the same 
effect. While these ideas have not been ignored, they have been proposed far less often 
than laws banning the use of cell phones or hand-held phones. A selective ban, such as a 
ban on young drivers, might be cost-effective, but would probably be too hard to enforce.  
Some may argue that the disconnect between law and policy analysis is 
unimportant, but policy errors m ay be significant when a particular risk is not put in 
context, or the response to policy measures are not considered carefully. Misperception of 
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risk could lead to policies that fail to allocate resources in a way that saves the maximum 
number of lives for a given expenditure of society’s resources. 
Moreover, unintended consequences of regulation also need to be considered very 
carefully. Consider some possible perverse consequences of a strictly enforced total ban. 
If drivers cannot call ahead and say they will be late, they may speed. If drivers cannot 
call for directions, they may choose to read a map while driving. If they cannot save time 
by calling and driving, they may save time by eating and driving. These activities involve 
risks comparable to the risk associated with using a cell phone, and may counteract some 
or all of the safety advantages of a ban.
 260  
A ban on the use of hand-held devices also could have unintended consequences. 
Indeed, there is a real danger of a net loss in safety. A hand-held ban could convince 
consumers that hands-free devices are safe, thereby encouraging their use. Since hands-
free devices do represent some risk, this might very well decrease overall safety.  
Broader issues about the impact of changing technology are also being ignored by 
policy makers. Since consumers do, at least to some extent, demand safety while driving, 
it is possible that consumer demand will induce creative solutions to the cell phone 
problem. Government is unlikely to pick the best available technology or to encourage its 
development by banning cell phones while driving. As long as the technology is changing 
as rapidly as it has in the last decade, a light-handed approach to regulation is probably 
best unless there is compelling evidence supporting a different approach.  
Government should carefully monitor problems that could arise from driver 
inattentiveness.
  Consumer demand for more conveniences while driving is likely to 
increase the number of electronic devices in cars. DVD players, televisions, G PS 
systems, faxes and computers may all be common in vehicles in the near future. This 
means that cell phones will represent one of many potential distractions. Any regulation 
should consider all of these distractions and remain neutral among them unless there are 
clear reasons to do otherwise. 
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The disconnect between law and policy analysis examined here points to a deeper 
problem in the design of institutions for managing risks.
261 There have been several 
proposals for addressing these problems.
262 Here, we wish to identify two important 
elements in a reasoned approach to risk management. The first is to develop a sound 
information base upon which to make decisions. The second is to develop a sound 
mechanism for reaching a decision.  
A sound information base will inevitably require some articulation of the costs 
and benefits–both quantitative and qualitative.
263 This information base can be developed 
through some combination of private and public support. Ideally, it should be based on 
the best available science and economics for problems with high stakes, such as the use 
of cell phones by drivers.  
A sound mechanism for reaching a decision depends crucially on the objectives of 
public policy in managing complex risks. For example, if the objective were to hold 
politicians directly accountable for such decisions, one could argue that elected officials 
should be required to vote on appropriate policies. If the preferred objective were 
transparency, then one could emphasize public access to the information used in decision 
making. Some would argue that policy should be guided by the precautionary principle, 
which would restrict a potentially harmful technology or action until it is proven to be 
safe.
264 
We would favor an approach that directs an executive agency with oversight 
responsibility to help select policies that maximize some definition of economic welfare, 
such as economic efficiency. This agency should not be an agency with a single mission, 
such as consumer product safety, but rather an agency with more general responsibilities 
related to the development of sensible regulation. At the federal level, the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) serves this function.
265 The OMB oversees the 
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development of significant federal environmental, health and safety regulations.
266 The 
case of cell phones illustrates the need for states to develop analogous institutions, or for 
the federal government to help the states prioritize and analyze regulations, if only 
informally. 
Even if one were able to develop a sensible system f or generating good 
information on complex risk management issues, and a sensible mechanism for reaching 
a decision, politics will always play a role. And politics will always be driven more by 
the public’s perception of risk than the scientific measure of risk, even when the public’s 
perception is biased by media coverage, dramatic events or unfamiliarity. This is not 
necessarily bad and sometimes can be good–for example, when scientists and economists 
are wrong. But left unchecked, politics will produce a  haphazard agenda for risk 
management.
267  
We need public institutions to study sources of risk and consider the costs and 
benefits of various policy responses, including possible unintended consequences. Such 
institutions could place more reliance on the role of “experts” in policy design. They 
could also include a more prominent role for scientists. We should work to design such 
institutions to reduce the disconnect between law and policy analysis- recognizing that it 
cannot and should not be completely eliminated. 
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Summary of Studies Reviewed in Section IV 
 
 
Table A-1: Summary of Experimental and Epidemiological Studies 
Study  Sample 
Size 
Methodology  Devices Compared  Conclusions 
Brookhius et al.
12 
Real car; Follow lead car 
and react to speed changes; 
3 driving conditions 
Hand-held vs. Hands-
free vs. Control 
Manual dialing affected 
steering wheel control 
Serafin et al. 
12 
Simulator; Performance 
measured by variance of 
lane position 
Manually Dialed vs. 
Voice Activated vs. 
Control 
Manual dialing was a 
greater disruption than 




Simulator; Response times 
measured for 47 traffic 
situations 
Manual Dialing vs. 






and tuning a radio are 
more distracting than 
dialing, which is more 
distracting than simple 
conversation 
Lamble et al. 
19 
Real car; Follow lead car 
and react to speed changes 
Manual Dialing vs. 
Verbal Task vs. 
Control 
Both the dialing task and 





Epidemiological study; Test 
for statistical relation 
between phone use and 
crashes; Subjects acted as 
own controls 
All Phones vs. Hands-
free vs. Incoming Calls 
Phone use was associated 
with a four-fold increase 
in probability of a crash. 
Neither hands-free nor 
incoming calls were 
significantly safer. 
Strayer  et al. 
(1) 
64 
Simulator; Use a joystick to 
follow a cursor and react to 
braking event; Response 
times measured 
Listening to Radio vs. 
Listening to Book on 
Tape vs. Conversing 
on Hand-held Phone 
vs. Conversing on 
Hands-free Phone vs. 
Control 
Conversation was more 
distracting than listening 
to the radio or a book on 
tape. Hand-held and 
hands-free devices were 
equally distracting. 
Strayer  et al. 
(2) 
40 
Simulator; Follow a lead car 
and respond to speed 
changes; Two traffic 
conditions; Reaction time, 
collisions and other data 
recorded 
Conversing on Hands-
free Phone vs. Control 
Subjects reacted slower 
and had more collisions 




Real car; Respond to a 
stoplight, perform a lateral 
maneuver and execute a left 
turn; Speed changes, 
reaction time and other 
variables measured 
Respond to yes/no 
questions on audiotape 
vs. Control 
Interaction with the 
audiotape hurt 
performance in the lateral 




Real car; Eye movements 
recorded while driving 
under four real traffic 
Verbal Task vs. Mental 
Imaging Task vs. 
Control 
The mental imaging task 
affected visual attention 






conditions  but both had an effect 
compared to the control. 
McCarley et al. 
28 
Subjects had to identify 
changes between two 
similar pictures of traffic 
scene flashed in rapid 
succession 
Conversing via a Clip-
on Microphone vs. 
Control 
Conversation caused 
subjects to miss the 
changes more often and to 




Simulator; Subjects used a 
joystick to follow a cursor; 
Two levels of course 
difficulty 
Easy Verbal Task vs. 
Difficult Verbal Task 
vs. Control 
The difficult verbal task 
caused greater error, 
especially for the difficult 
tracking task. 
Sources: See Section IV for discussion and sources. 
 
 
Table A-2: Key Findings from Crash Data 
Study  Key Finding 
NHTSA (Crash 
Data)  More cell phone-related crashes are linked to conversation than dialing. 
AAA (Stutts et al.)  Cell phone-related crashes are a small fraction of distraction-related 
crashes. 
Japan 
Cell phone-related crashes decreased after a hand-held ban was passed. 




Table A-3: Conclusions from Literature Reviews 
Study  Conclusion 
Lissy et al.  “It is not clear whether hands-free cellular phone designs are significantly 
safer…” 
Independent Expert 
Group on Mobile 
Phones 
“There is therefore no strong empirical justification at present for the 
enactment of a policy or legislation that differentiates between the use of 
hand-held and hands-free phone sets in motor vehicles.” 
Cain and Burris  “However, research comparisons of hand-held and hands-free phones show 
that there is little difference in risk during the act of conversation due to the 
continued presence of a mental distraction.” 
NHTSA  “Hands-free designs will do nothing to mitigate the distraction potential of 
cellular telephone conversation.” 
Sources: See Section IV for discussion and sources. 